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In general, debt capital markets are roughly composed of two major types of financial 
transactions: straight debt finance and structured finance transactions. Structured finance refers to the 
design of financial products or instruments based on the use of flexible tools to meet, as closely as 
possible, the requirements of the originator or owner of an asset (or pool of assets) and the needs of 
investors. Thus, structured finance encompasses all financial arrangements helping to efficiently 
(re)finance a specified pool of assets beyond the scope of on-balance sheet financing products or 
instruments.
1
 According to Caselli and Gatti (2005) and Fabozzi et al. (2006) asset securitization, project 
finance, structured lease and leveraged corporate acquisition activities (mostly LBOs), are all different 
forms of structured finance (SF). 
In an economy à la Modigliani and Miller’s (1958), SF transactions would not exist, as they 
would offer no advantages over straight debt alternatives; i.e., in a world of perfect and liquid financial 
markets, where asymmetric information is not an issue, tranching or the act of encapsulating an initiative 
or a pool of assets in an ad hoc organization would not add value and a firm’s financing structure would 
be irrelevant. Thus, the existence of market imperfections, including asymmetric information, agency 
conflicts, market incompleteness, and market segmentation, can explain tranching, ‘off-balance sheet 
financing’ and the benefits of SF transactions.
2
 In this revised framework, structured financing may 
matter, because it creates value by minimizing the net costs associated with market imperfections. 
The literature on SF suggests two core economic motivations for originating a financing 
transaction under a structured model.
3
 The first relates to the fact that SF enables the financing of a 
particular asset class when established forms of external finance are unavailable for a particular financing 
need. The second economic benefit is a reduction in funding costs, when the benefits of the reduced cost 
of funding are greater than the cost of the required credit enhancement. Finnerty (1988), Caselli and Gatti 
(2005), Fabozzi et al. (2006), and Tavakoli (2008), among others, point out that making use of a 
                                                 
1
 This definition stems from the literature, as well as from the evidence which emerges from the observation of the 
practices of international and domestic intermediaries that compete in structured finance business area. Interesting 
studies on both theoretical and empirical literature in relation to structured finance include Caselli and Gatti (2005), 
Davis (2005), Fabozzi, Davis, and Choudhry (2006), Jobst (2007), Cherubini and Della Lunga (2007), and Fabozzi 
and Kothari (2007). 
2
 Tranching means the creation of multiple types of securities backed by the firm’s (or by the underlying asset pool, 
when considering securitization) assets and is considered one of the most important features that distinguishes SF 
instruments from traditional debt products. See, e.g., DeMarzo (2005) for further details. 
3
 See, among others, Esty (2003), Esty and Megginson (2003), Caselli and Gatti (2005), DeMarzo (2005), Fender 
and Mitchell (2005), Fabozzi, et al. (2006), Tavakoli (2008), Gorton and Metrick (2013), and references therein. 
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structured basis – a transaction that is specifically structured using an SPV and is secured by ring-fencing 
assets producing cash flows solely for supporting the transaction – reduces the cost of funding. The same 
intuition is presented by Davidson, Sanders, Wolff, and Ching (2003), Roever and Fabozzi (2003), Jost 
(2006), and Fabozzi and Kothari (2007) for asset securitization. Securitization offers a low cost and 
credible way for information about the firm’s receivables to be produced and provided to investors. 
Similarly, Esty (2003) and Caselli and Gatti (2005) argue that the use of project finance may enable 
sponsors to obtain a reduction in the net cost of financing. Project finance creates value by resolving 
agency problems, reducing asymmetric information costs, and improving risk management [Brealey, 
Cooper, and Habib (1996), Esty (2003, 2004a, 2004b), and Corielli, Gatti, and Steffanoni (2010)]. 
The existing literature on security design also supports this idea; i.e., optimal contractual 
arrangements derived in the financial contracting literature are mechanisms used to resolve different types 
of conflicts of interest or asymmetric information problems that arise in agency relationships between 
economic agents [Sannikov (2013)]. Allen and Gale (1988) suggest that successful SF instruments 
allocate cash flows to the investors who value them the most, allowing securities to be held in their most 
efficient form. Lacker (1990), Allen and Winton (1995), Hart and Moore (1995), and Winton (1995) 
provide interesting results on how different levels of seniority of debt contract can mitigate agency 
problems. Lacker (1990) and Winton (1995) models can be applied to explain some features of asset 
securitization transactions, in which two or more tranches are issued with different degrees of seniority 
among investors. Regarding adverse selection considerations, Diamond (1993), Winton (1995), and 
Glaeser and Kallal (1997) argue that the design and issuance of different classes of securities with 
different degrees of seniority – structuring – reduces monitoring costs. Boot and Thakor (1993), 
Riddiough (1997), DeMarzo and Duffie (1999), and DeMarzo (2005) show that a financial institution can 
reduce asymmetric information costs by pooling assets and issuing different types of securities against the 
pool of cash flows. Similarly, Fulghieri and Lukin (2001) argue that in securitization the originator may 
prefer to issue a security with ‘high information sensitivity’ if he intends to maintain a residual equity 
position in the pool of assets. 
If SF transactions allow the reduction of funding costs when compared with traditional sources of 
funds, then the rates charged on SF transactions should be lower than the rates charged on straight debt 
finance (SDF) transactions. Due to the difference in underlying risks, the relevant pricing factors for these 
two types of debt instruments should also differ. This idea is corroborated by recent research, which 
suggests that project finance loans might be fundamentally different from other syndicated loans and bond 
issues [Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) and Sorge and Gadanecz (2008)]. This raises three questions: (1) 
How do common pricing factors compare between SF and SDF transactions? (2) Is the credit spread on 
SF transactions significantly different to the credit spread on SDF transactions? And (3) to what extent 
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are SF and SDF transactions priced by common factors? These questions lead us to test three hypotheses. 
First, we intend to argue that not only the ex ante credit spreads but even the common pricing factors 
differ significantly between SF and SDF transactions. Second, we hope to answer if SF structures are 
sufficiently good at overcoming agency problems, and/or at reducing asymmetric information costs. The 
third hypothesis states that the credit spreads associated with SF and SDF transactions are influenced 
differently by common pricing factors. 
The 2007/2008 financial crisis played a significant role in the failure of numerous businesses, due 
to a decline in consumer wealth, and a downturn in economic activity, contributing to the European 
sovereign debt crisis. Additionally, it has somewhat tarnished the previously prevailing positive image of 
structured finance, particularly asset securitization, as a process to help remedy deficiencies in financial 
markets, arising from incomplete capital allocation [e.g., IMF (2008b), Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009), 
and Brunnermeier (2009)]. This raises one additional question: Is the credit spread on SF and SDF 
transactions significantly affected by the 2007/2008 financial crisis? This question leads us to test a 
fourth hypothesis with the purpose of studying the impact of the financial crisis and the subsequent 
European sovereign debt crisis on SF and SDF credit spreads and pricing factors in Western Europe. We 
therefore examine whether the credit spread changes across time, by considering a pre-crisis period from 
January 1
st
, 2000 through to September 14
th
, 2008, and a crisis period from September 15
th




Finally, the term structure of SF, as well as of SDF transactions appears as a particular puzzle. 
For project finance loans, Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) conclude that project finance loan pricing is 
not a positive function of maturity. Sorge and Gadanecz (2008) study this apparent absence of a clear 
relationship between spreads and maturity in project finance loans and show that the term structure of 
credit spreads is ‘hump-shaped’. Regarding corporate bonds, several authors [e.g., Jones, Mason, and 
Rosenfeld (1984), Sarig and Warga (1989), Duffie and Singleton (2001), and Sorge and Gadanecz 
(2008)] argue that, on average, the term structure of credit spreads for investment grade bonds appears 
upward-sloping. However, the literature has been more controversial regarding the term structure of credit 
spreads for non-investment grade bonds – Fons (1987), Sarig and Warga (1989), and Helwege and Turner 
(1999) find downward-sloping term structures of credit spreads for non-investment grade bonds. 
Regarding securitization, empirical research [Vink and Thibeault (2008)] finds an insignificant (for ABS) 
or significant negative relationship (for MBS and CDO) between spread and maturity. Considering that 
SF transactions are characterized by much longer maturities compared to other forms of financing, we 
raise one final question: are longer maturities perceived by lenders as a risk per se? Answering this 
question is crucial to understand the peculiar nature of credit risk in SF; i.e., given the characteristics of 
SF transactions, should we expect the term structure of credit spreads for SF issues to behave differently 
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from that of SDF issues? This question leads us to test a fifth hypothesis with the purpose of studying the 
impact of maturity on SF and SDF credit spreads. 
To our knowledge, no full-scale empirical study of SF in Western Europe has yet been published, 
namely studying the impact of the 2007/2008 crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis on 
the credit spread of loans and bonds. Despite its use on a worldwide basis and several decades of history, 
a number of key issues regarding the specific risk determinants of SF, vis-a-vis SDF, remain largely 
unresolved. We believe our study is the first to investigate how ex ante credit spread and common pricing 
factors compare between SF and SDF transactions. A sample of loans – 2,859 project finance loans – and 
bonds – 599 asset securitization bonds and 20,977 corporate bonds – issued by Western European 
borrowers between January 1
st
, 2000 and December 31
st
, 2011 has been used in the study. We rely on 
asset securitization bonds and project finance loans as proxies for SF transactions and on corporate bonds 
as a proxy for SDF transactions. Project finance and asset securitization transactions typically consist of 
several tranches funding the same special purpose vehicle (SPV). Therefore, the unit of observation is a 
single issue or a single loan tranche. 
The relative pricing of SF versus SDF issues is one of the most important findings presented in 
our univariate analysis. Average credit spreads are statistically and significantly higher for project finance 
loans (198.3 bps) than they are for asset securitization bonds (148.9 bps) and corporate bonds (157.6 bps). 
On the contrary, average credit spreads for asset securitization and corporate bond issues do not differ 
significantly. We also find that most of the common pricing characteristics differ significantly, not only 
between SF and SDF issues but also among SF transactions. All pair-wise comparisons indicate 
statistically significant differences in value, with the exception of credit spread, tranche size, and currency 
risk between asset securitization and corporate bond issues. The financial crisis does have a significant 
impact on SF and SDF credit spreads. The evidence strongly supports the assumption that the average 
credit spread is economically and statistically higher for project finance loans (329.1 bps versus 136.9 
bps), asset securitization bonds (206.5 bps versus 143.5 bps), and corporate bonds (220.3 bps versus 
125.5) during the crisis period. Additionally, the 2007/2008 financial crisis and the subsequent European 
sovereign debt crisis have a substantial impact on the common pricing factors of loan and bond 
transactions. We corroborate these findings in our regression analysis, after controlling for other micro 
and macroeconomic pricing factors. 
We conclude that SF and SDF transactions are not priced in a single integrated market. Moreover, 
even project finance and asset securitization issues are priced in segmented capital markets. Accepting 
our third hypothesis also means that we cannot estimate the full sample of loans and bonds in a single 
regression. Hence, we examine the determinants of credit spreads for each type of issue using an OLS 
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regression framework. Although some variable coefficients have the expected features, others are not in 
line with the empirical literature (e.g., currency risk coefficient for project finance loans). 
We identify several economic rationales that might explain why we should expect a different 
shape for the term structure of credit spreads for SF vis-a-vis SDF transactions. For project finance loans, 
we find a robust hump-shaped relationship between credit spread and maturity. On the contrary, a linear 
positive relationship between credit spread and maturity remains strongly significant for corporate bond 
issues while it appears insignificant for asset securitization bonds. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on SF, details the research 
questions and presents the methodology. Section 3 describes the Dealscan and DCM Analytics databases 
used in this study. The basic characteristics for the full and high-information samples of SF versus SDF 
transactions are also presented here. In section 4, the financial characteristics of SF issues are compared 
with the sample of SDF bonds. We also study the impact of the financial crisis on credit spreads and 
pricing factors. Section 5 examines the extent to which SF and SDF transactions are priced by common 
factors. We begin by presenting the methodology and discussing the sets of micro and macro variables 
and their expected impact on the credit spread. Next, we present the regression analyses results. Section 6 
provides robustness checks using alternative and rearranged variables. We also check whether our results 
are affected by potential endogeneity problems. Section 7 concludes the study. 
2. Background Information and Hypotheses 
2.1. Structured Finance 
SF is related to the design of financial instruments based on the use of contracting tools and 
mechanisms to meet, as closely as possible, the different requirements and needs of borrowers and 
investors. Thus, SF encompasses all financial arrangements helping to efficiently (re)finance a specified 
pool of assets beyond the scope of on-balance sheet financing [Cherubini and Della Lunga (2007), 
Fabozzi and Kothari (2007), and Jobst (2007)]. As poited out by Leland (2007), SF “… typically refers to 
the transfer of a subset of a company´s assets (an “activity”) into a bankruptcy-remote corporation or 
other special purpose vehicle or entity (SPV/SPE).” 
In an SF transaction, the requirements of the owner of the assets or cash flows refer to liquidity, 
funding, risk transfer, efficient risk allocation, favorable capital, tax and accounting treatment, or other 
needs. Instruments are usually designed, namely in terms of covenants, warrantees, corporate structure, 
contracts, and trusts, to achieve segregation of those assets or cash flows from the originator or sponsor of 
the transaction. Additionally, credit enhancement mechanisms are implemented (e.g., the use of 
warrantees to enhance recoveries and tranching to define risk attachment points). In brief, there are three 
main specificities of SF. First, the critical role played by the vehicle company; i.e., the recipient of the 
raised funds is a separate entity from the party or parties sponsoring the transaction, which plays an 
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important role in the segmentation of cash flows and risks in a form proving more attractive for investors, 
through a structuring process.
4
 Secondly, the high level of leverage, and finally, the centrality of 
prospective cash flow in order to evaluate the feasibility of the operation.  
Prior research has identified the following main categories of SF transactions: (i) asset 
securitization;
5
 (ii) project finance;
6
 (iii) structured leasing;
7
 and (iv) leveraged acquisitions, namely 
Leveraged Buy-Outs (LBOs)
8
 [Roever and Fabozzi (2003), Caselli and Gatti (2005), Davis (2005), 
Gorton and Souleles (2005), and Fabozzi et al. (2006)]. As referred, in our study we rely on project 
finance (PF) loans and asset securitization (AS) bonds as proxies for SF transactions. 
PF is the process of financing a specific economic unit that the sponsors create, in which 
creditors share much of the venture’s business risk and funding is obtained strictly for the project itself. 
Often used for capital-intensive facilities and utilities, it is commonly used to segregate the credit risk of 
the project – by creating a legally independent project company – from that of its sponsors so that lenders, 
investors, and other parties will appraise the project strictly on its own merits. The allocation of specific 
project risks to those parties best able to manage them is one of the key comparative advantages of PF 
[Brealey et al. (1996), Esty (2004b), Caselli and Gatti (2005), and Fabozzi et al. (2006)]. 
AS means a process by which an entity pools together its interest in identifiable future cash flows, 
transfers the claims on those future cash flows to another entity that is specifically created for the sole 
purpose of holding those financial claims, and then issue negotiable securities to be placed into the 
market. Contrary to the traditional secured bonds, where it is the ability of the originator (or issuer) to 
generate sufficient cash flows to reimburse the debt that determines the risks of the transaction, in AS the 
source of repayments/funds shifts from the cash flows of the issuer to the cash flows generated by the 
securitized assets and/or a third party that guarantees the payments whenever cash flows become 
insufficient [Fabozzi et al. (2006) and Vink and Thibeault (2008)]. Securitization securities are issued as 
subordinated, negotiable contingent claims (tranches) with varying seniority and maturity, backed by the 
credit payment performance of securitized assets. The markets for the securities issued through 
securitization are composed of three main classes [Blum and DiAngelo (1997) and Kothari (2006)]: asset-
backed securities (ABS), mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). 
                                                 
4
 For similar viewpoint see Caselli and Gatti (2005), Davis (2005), Akbiyikli et al. (2006), and Leland (2007). 
5
 For further details see, e.g., Davidson et al. (2003), Roever and Fabozzi (2003), Kothari (2006), Jobst (2007), 
Tavakoli (2008), Gorton and Metrick (2013), and references therein. 
6
 For further discussion see, e.g., Brealey et al. (1996), Kleimeier and Megginson (2000), Esty (2003, 2004a, 
2004b), Caselli and Gatti (2005), Blanc-Brude and Strange (2007), Gatti (2008), and references therein.  
7
 For a comprehensive account of theoretical and empirical literature on structured leasing see, among others, 
Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (1990), Caselli and Gatti (2005), Fabozzi et al. (2006), and Deo (2009). 
8
 For further discussion see, e.g., Arzac (2005), Caselli and Gatti (2005), Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), Rosenbaum 
and Pearl (2009), and Guo et al. (2011). 
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Securities backed by mortgages are called MBS, securities backed by debt obligations are called CDOs, 
and securities backed by consumer-backed products are called ABS. 
To analyze the motivations for using SF instruments, first and foremost it is crucial to understand 
why they create value. SF can create value by reducing the net costs associated with market 
imperfections. The literature on SF suggests several economic motivations for originating a financing 
transaction under a structured model.
9
 First, it enables the financing of a unique asset class that (i) 
previously may have been financed only by traditional borrowing methods; or (ii) could not be financed at 
all without SF. SF thus plays a critical role as a new and diverse source of funding. The second economic 
benefit lies in cost reduction, when the benefits of the reduced cost of funding are greater than the cost of 
the required credit enhancement. The third advantage refers to maintaining the sponsors’ financial 
flexibility by creating vehicle companies (SPVs) designated to take on the initiative, helping sponsors to 
protect their own credit standing and future access to financial markets, by improving or maintaining 
financial and regulatory ratios. Additionally, SF transactions allow originators or sponsors to transfer the 
risk of assets or liabilities and to carry out additional business without expanding their balance sheet. SF 
also contributes to improving operational and informational market efficiency, reducing agency costs, and 
reducing information asymmetries. Finally, it also allows the issuer to leverage up, compared to senior 
unsecured debt, and to increase tax shields/savings. 
Despite the previously mentioned economic benefits for sponsors and investors, SF transactions 
also have disadvantages, especially when used inappropriately. SF transactions are fairly complex and 
involve a significant amount of cash flow evaluation, due diligence, negotiation, and legal procedures. 
Consequently, structuring such a deal is more costly than corporate financing. Moreover, it can be said 
that there is a broad consensus that securitization played an important role in the development and 
propagation of the 2007-2008 financial crisis.
10
 One can thus identify the following problems related to 
the use of SF transactions:
11
 (i) complexity; (ii) off-balance sheet treatment; (iii) asymmetric information 
problems; (iv) agency problems; (v) higher transaction costs; and (vi) wealth expropriation. 
2.2. Hypotheses and Methodology 
The five questions raised in the previous section as well as the literature review help us to 
develop the following hypotheses with respect to SF credit spreads:
12
 
                                                 
9
 See, among others, Greenbaum and Thakor (1987), Oldfield (1997), Esty (2003), Caselli and Gatti (2005), 
DeMarzo (2005), Fender and Mitchell (2005), Akbiyikli et al. (2006), Fabozzi et al. (2006), Leland (2007), Tavakoli 
(2008), and Gorton and Metrick (2013), and references therein. 
10
 See, among others, IMF (2008a, 2008b), Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009), and Brunnermeier (2009). 
11
 See, e.g., Caselli and Gatti (2005), Fabozzi et al. (2006), Gorton (2009), and Gorton and Metrick (2013). 
12
 We use the issuance credit spread (or the tranche spread at closing). Kleimeier and Megginson (2000), Gabbi and 
Sironi (2005), Blanc-Brude and Strange (2007), Vink and Thibeault (2008), Sorge and Gadanecz (2008), and Gatti, 
Kleimeier, Megginson, and Steffanoni (2013) among others, use the same variable. 
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Hypothesis 1: The pricing factors of SF credit spreads differ significantly from the pricing factors of SDF 
credit spreads. 
Hypothesis 2: The credit spread on SF is lower than or equal to the credit spread on SDF. 
Hypothesis 3: The impact of pricing factors on credit spread differs significantly between SF and SDF 
transactions. 
Hypothesis 4: After controlling for macroeconomic conditions and loan characteristics, the 2007/2008 
financial crisis did have a significant impact on SF and SDF credit spreads. 
Hypothesis 5: After controlling for microeconomic and macroeconomic pricing factors, the term structure 
of credit spreads for SF issues do not behave differently from that of SDF issues. 
The purpose of testing the first and second hypotheses is to provide extensive insight into the 
common characteristics and pricing factors associated with SF and SDF financial instruments and to 
elaborate on any substantial differences between them. In testing Hypotheses 1 and 2 we use a parametric 
test (Student’s t-test) for continuous variables and a non-parametric test (Fisher's exact test) for dummy 
variables, to compare whether the distribution of the reported values for SF and SDF tranches are 
significantly different. 
The third hypothesis states that various different variables determine the credit spread, and it may 
well happen that the impact of these variables on the credit spread is different between SF and SDF 
transactions. Furthermore, the degree of impact on the spread could differ from one financial instrument 
class to another. In testing Hypothesis 3, a structural change test is used. To implement the Chow test 
[Chow (1960)] we first run one ordinary least squares regression on the common pricing variables 
(independent variables) and the credit spread (dependent variable), under the assumption that all types of 
issues – PF loans, AS bonds, and corporate bonds (CB) – have the same explanatory variables. Then, 
coefficients from separate regressions are obtained from each type of issue, yielding three regressions: 
one for PF loans, one for AS bonds, and one for CB. Based on the residual sum of changes of each 
regression, an F-test of structural change is computed (also called a Chow test). Hypothesis 3 will be 
accepted if the computed F value exceeds the critical value, and will be rejected if the F value remains 
smaller than its critical level. Should Hypothesis 3 be rejected, examining the coefficients will allow us to 
determine loan pricing factors for AS, PF, and CB issues; i.e., a regression test will be run on one sample 
only to determine the pricing variables. If it is the case that Hypothesis 3 is accepted, regressions on AS, 
PF, and CB will be run to examine the relationship between the pricing variables and the credit spread for 
each type of debt issue, separately, for comparison. 
The purpose of answering the fourth question is to provide extensive insight into the impact of the 
financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis on SF and SDF credit spreads. This is 
of further relevance once there is a broad consensus about the important role played by SF transactions, 
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especially asset securitization, in the development and propagation of the 2007/2008 financial crisis.
13
 As 
IMF (2008a) suggests, “… the proliferation of new complex structured finance products, markets, and 
business models exposed the financial system to a funding disruption and breakdown in confidence…” 
and that particular products “… exacerbated the depth and duration of the crisis by adding uncertainty 
relating to their valuation as the underlying fundamentals deteriorated.” Considering this, since the second 
half of 2008 a flight to quality might have left many investors and intermediaries in the Western European 
countries credit-rationed. Hence, SF borrowers and lenders might have also changed their attitude towards 
SF in terms of pricing and compensation. We are therefore examining whether the credit spreads change 
over time, by considering a pre-crisis period from January 1
st
, 2000 through to September 14
th
, 2008, and 
a crisis period from September 15
th




Given the controversy in the literature regarding the term structure of credit spreads for 
speculative-grade issuers and even the empirical puzzle of the term structure of project finance loans, the 
purpose of answering the fifth question is to analyze the term structure of credit spreads for SF 
transactions compared to SDF transactions. 
3. Data and Sample Selection 
3.1. Data Description 
Our sample consists of individual loans and bond offers extracted from DealScan and DCM 
Analytics databases, respectively. DCM Analytics database (formerly Bondware database) is compiled by 
Dealogic and offers comprehensive information of debt securities issued on the debt capital markets. 
DealScan database is provided by Thomson Reuters LPC, a market information provider of individual 
deal information on the global syndicated loan markets. Information is available on the micro 
characteristics of the loan and bond offers (e.g., transaction and tranche size, maturity, currency, pricing, 
rating, type of interest rate) and of the borrowers (e.g., name, nationality, industry sector). The reason for 
using two databases is that we require information about the pricing characteristics of SF and SDF 
transactions. In fact, while DCM Analytics provides very detailed information regarding CB (used as a 
proxy for SDF transactions) and AS, Dealscan has particularly rich data about PF loans. We use AS and 
PF as proxies for SF transactions.
14
 
                                                 
13
 Besides the fact that asset securitization instruments are complex vis-à-vis SDF transactions, two major problems 
are commonly pointed out, underlying the roots of the 2007-2008 credit crunch: (i) asymmetric information 
problems; and (ii) agency problems. See, among others, IMF (2008a, 2008b), Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009), 
Brunnermeier (2009), and Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011). 
14
 As pointed out in section 1, one can identify four types of SF transactions: PF, AS, structured leases (SL), and 
leveraged acquisitions (mainly LBOs). We rely on PF and AS as proxies for SF transactions because: (i) there is no 
public information on SL transactions; and (ii) LBOs can be implemented without an SPV to facilitate the 
transaction, which is a key element of an SF transaction. 
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These databases contain detailed historical information on virtually the entire population of bond 
securities (DCM Analytics) and syndicated loans (DealScan) issued in the international capital markets 
from January 1
st
, 2000 through to December 31
st
, 2011. Although the database extracted from DCM 
Analytics contains information on several types of bonds, we include only those with a deal type code of 
“corporate bond investment-grade”, “corporate bond high-yield”, “asset-backed security”, and “mortgage-
backed security”.
15
 We include bond tranches classified either as fixed rate bonds (with coupon rate 
information) or variable rate bonds (with both spread and index information). For variable rate bonds, 
only those quoted on the following indices were included: Euribor, Euro Libor, USD Libor, and GBP 
Libor. While Dealscan database contains historical information about syndicated loans and related 
banking instruments, we examine only loans with a deal specific purpose code of “project finance”. We 
also require, for both databases, that the Borrower/Issuer country belongs to Western Europe and that the 
tranche size (in Euro millions) be available.
16
 After applying these screens, we are able to examine a total 
of 24,435 debt issues (worth Euro 6,297.8 billion).
17
 Our sample contains information on 599 AS issues 
(worth Euro 179.1 billion) – of which 430 issues (worth Euro 106.3 billion) have a deal type code of ABS 
and 169 issues (worth Euro 72.9 billion) have a deal type code of MBS –, 20,977 CB issues (worth Euro 
5,786.5 billion), and 2,859 PF issues (worth Euro 332.1 billion). We refer to this as our ‘full sample’.
18
 
Table 1 presents basic characteristics for the full sample of PF, AS, and CB issues. Significant 
differences are revealed between both SF and SDF issues, as well as between the two categories of SF 
issues. One of the most remarkable findings is how much larger AS and CB tranches are than PF 
tranches. These issues have mean values of 299 Euro millions (M€) and 276 M€, respectively, compared 
with 116 M€ for PF issues. Thus, with regards to tranche size, AS securities are similar to SDF securities. 
This can be explained by the fact that both transactions involve the offer of securities in the capital 
markets, while syndicated loans are the prominent form of funding for project finance investments. 
**** Insert Table 1 about here **** 
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 We exclude bond issues which have a deal type code of ‘Medium-Term Note’, ‘Non-Us Agency’, ‘Covered 
Bonds’, and ‘Collateralized-Debt Obligation’. Perpetual bonds and bonds with additional features such as step-up, 
caps, or floors were also excluded from the database. Due to the important role played by CDOs in the 2007/2008 
financial crisis – CDOs based on MBS linked to the subprime market were negatively affected inflicting enormous 
losses on investors – and as CDO issues are frequently backed by ABS and MBS, we decided to exclude CDOs from 
our AS dataset. 
16
 We consider the following countries as pertaining to Western Europe: Austria; Belgium; Cyprus; Denmark; 
Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Luxemburg; the Netherlands; Norway; Portugal; Spain; 
Sweden; Switzerland; and the United Kingdom. 
17
 We verify with Thomson Reuters that our PF sample refers to loans made to a vehicle company and with Dealogic 
that our AS sample refers to securities sold to investors by bankruptcy-remote special purpose vehicles (SPVs). 
18
 As the unit of observation is a single issue or a single loan tranche, multiple issues from the same transaction or 
deal appear as separate observations in our database. 
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According to the average maturity (years) variable, the three types of loans are substantially 
different financing instruments. The average maturity of PF loans, 13.6 years, is significantly lower that 
of the AS bonds full sample (20.9 years), but considerably longer than that of the CB full sample (5.3 
years). Additionally, compared to AS and CB samples, PF loans involve more than twice the number of 
banks in the transaction. Furthermore, AS and CB transactions are more likely to be exposed to currency 
risk when compared to the PF full sample. 
The most remarkable similarity between SF instruments is how frequently PF loans and AS 
bonds are issued with third-party guarantees (96.9% and 100%, respectively). This largely meets the 
standard characteristics of PF and AS transactions. Contrary to the traditional CB, where it is the ability 
of the issuer to generate sufficient cash flows to repay the debt obligation that determines the risks of the 
transaction, in AS the source of repayments shift from the cash flows of the issuer to the cash flows 
generated by the securitized assets and/or a third party guarantor, in case of default. In a PF transaction, 
the financing is structured with as little recourse as possible to the sponsor, while at the same time 
providing sufficient credit support through collaterals or third party guarantees, so that lenders will be 
satisfied with the credit risk. 
3.2. Loans and Bonds Pricing Samples 
Since we wish to determine whether SF instruments are more or less expensive for borrowers 
than SDF securities, and to compare the common pricing characteristics associated with PF, AS and CB 
issues, we select from our full sample those issues that have complete data on credit spread. This screen 
has yielded a “high-information” sub-sample of 12,080 loans (worth 4,962,996 M€), of which 1,090 
(worth 158,487 M€) have been classified as PF loans, 439 as AS bonds (worth 140,733 M€), and 10,551 
as CB issues (4,663,777 M€). Our high-information samples include issues with five default and recovery 
risk characteristics (credit rating, loan to value, time to maturity, tranches with guarantee, and country 
risk); nine marketability characteristics (tranche size, number of tranches, number of bookrunners, 
number of banks, type of interest rate, tranches to U.K. borrowers, tranches to financial institutions, and, 
finally, management fee); and one systematic risk characteristic (tranches with currency risk). 
On average, we document a relatively high survival rate from the full sample to the high-
information sample (54.7% for PF loans, 75.2% for AS bonds, and 54.3% for CB).
19
 Therefore, we 
assume that any empirical results derived from the high-information sub-samples can be extended to the 
larger population of all issues. Tables 2 and 3, our high-information samples, include several variables of 
interest. Although most of these are self-explanatory, a few of them require definition. 
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 A comparison of the common variables in the full samples and in the high-information samples reveals that the 
high-information issues are not dissimilar to their counterparties in terms of credit spread (remain the same), default 
and recovery risk characteristics, marketability characteristics, and systematic risk characteristic. In the interest of 
space we do not show the results. The results are available from the authors. 
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The credit spread corresponds to the price for the risk associated with the financing instrument, 
on the basis of available information, at the time of issue. For PF loans, the credit spread represents the 
spread paid by the borrower over 3-month Euribor or 3-month Libor. For bonds, the spread is defined as 
the margin yielded by the security at issue above a corresponding currency treasury benchmark with a 
comparable maturity. None of these measures are perfect proxies for the credit risk associated with loans 
and bonds. In particular, the spread over Euribor or Libor does not represent the full economic cost of 
credit. Loans and bonds also carry fees that can be related to creditworthiness and performance.
20
 
Considering the scarcity of secondary market prices and the absence of borrowers’ rating data, 
the spread over Euribor or Libor for loans and the margin yielded by the security at time of issue above a 
comparable risk-free government security for bonds, have become standard pricing measures in the 
literature. Even for AS bonds, we exclude secondary market spreads, because of the relatively poor 
liquidity of the secondary market for these securities. The comparability of our pricing variables across 
loans and bonds can be improved by making the following adjustment:
21
 while in PF loans the benchmark 
priced off Euribor or Libor is a three-month interbank rate, bonds typically carry a spread over a 
benchmark government security (e.g., German Treasury Bonds). Therefore, there is a difference between 
the two benchmarks represented by different credit risk levels involving unsecured short-term bank risk 
and a risk-free government rate. Following the approach of Thomas and Wang (2004) and Sorge and 
Gadanecz (2008), we adjust for the risk difference of the bond and loan benchmarks by adding to the 
Euribor or Libor spread of the PF loans the difference between the three-month Euro Libor and the three-
month German Treasury bill at the time when the loans were granted.
22
 
Credit rating evaluates the capacity of the borrower to repay interest and principal on time as 
promised. Since we need a consistent rating classification scheme, we use the rating scales as shown in 
Table 2. This classification scheme consists of 22 rating scales for two rating agencies – Standard & 
Poor’s (S&P) and Moody’s. Loan and bond ratings are based on the S&P and Moody’s rating at the time 
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 As pointed out by Sorge and Gadanecz (2008), “… additional pricing factors, such as commitment fees, 
underwriting fees, participation fees, and utilization fees are typically charged during loan syndications and indeed 
during the whole lifetime of the loan.” Additionally, the bond issue also carries fees, namely up-front fees. 
21
 Despite the adjustment, we are aware that the comparability between loans and bonds has some drawbacks, 
including that most bonds are fixed rate while loans are priced over a floating rate - all of our 1,090 available 
observations on PF loans credit spread are floating rate issues -, and that bonds and loans may have quite different 
covenants. In section 4, we include dummies in our baseline regressions that attempt to control for these differences. 
22
 The average difference is 31 basis points and has a standard deviation of 44 basis points during our sample period. 
Additionally, as loans are priced over a three month rate while bonds tend to be priced off longer-term benchmarks, 
we will include as additional control in our regression analysis (section 5) the slope of the Euro swap curve as the 




of issuing the bond or closing the loan.
23
 Country risk is approximated by Standard & Poor’s country 
credit rating at close and converted as presented in Table 2. Thus, this variable measures from 1 for the 
countries with the lowest risk to 22 for the countries of highest risk. Other measures of country risk are 
available and have been used in other studies – such as the monthly data compiled by the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) or the country risk rank provided by Euromoney magazine. The use of 
S&P’s country rating is justified by its strong correlation with these alternative measures.
24
 
**** Insert Table 2 about here **** 
Loan to value ratio represents the ratio of the tranche size to the transaction size of a given loan or 
bond issue. This variable is included in our analysis because we intend to control for credit protection of 
all positions taken by lenders. To compute loan to value ratios, we manually calculated the weight of each 
loan or bond tranche in each transaction that contains more than one tranche. If the transaction contains 
one tranche only, the loan to value ratio is 100%. As will be discussed more fully bellow, this variable 
should have an important role in SF instruments. For example, in an AS transaction, each senior class has 
absolute priority in the cash flow over the more junior classes, the so-called subordination credit 
enhancement mechanism. As junior classes are typically smaller than the senior ones, we find lower loan 
to value ratios for these tranches. 
The credit spread on SF and SDF is modeled as a function of microeconomic variables. 
Additionally, we control for the macroeconomic conditions (e.g., the level of interest rates, the market 
volatility, and the slope of the Euro yield curve). The data on macroeconomic variables are obtained from 
DataStream. We linked the macroeconomic variables and the microeconomic information contained in 
the loans (DealScan) and bonds (DCM Analytics) databases on the active date (PF loans) or issue date 
(AS and CB issues). The main problem in choosing a set of variables for each type of issue is the 
requirement that each set must be meaningful for PF, AS, and CB issues. Several variables were available 
for the three types of financing instruments used, which allows us to directly compare the main pricing 
factors for SF and SDF instruments.
25
 An overview of the variables and their expected impact on ex ante 
credit spreads, taking into consideration the existing literature, is provided in section 5. 
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 This classification scheme follows the approach proposed by Sorge and Gadanecz (2008), Vink and Thibeault 
(2008), and Gatti et al. (2013). 
24
 Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta (1996) find that S&P’s and Moody’s ratings have a 90% rank-order correlation with 
the IRCG financial rating. Corielli et al. (2010) present a high correlation (0.902) between S&P ratings and 
Euromoney country risk scores. 
25
 We identified the possible variables to use as instruments for the credit spread based on the available literature [in 
particular, Kleimeier and Megginson (2000), Gabbi and Sironi (2005), Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005), Chen, 
Lesmond, and Wei (2007), Sorge and Gadanecz (2008), Vink and Thibeault (2008), Corielli et al. (2010), Flannery, 
Nikolova, and Öztekin (2012), and Gatti el al. (2013)]. Furthermore, the opinions collected during verbal 
discussions with top investment banks confirm our choices. 
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4. Financial Characteristics of SF versus SDF transactions 
This section provides a full-length statistical analysis of SF versus SDF lending in Western 
Europe. We start by comparing the financial characteristics of PF loans with the sample of AS bonds, as 
well as with our CB sample. Univariate tests of differences between PF, AS, and CB issues are also 
presented. Finally, non-parametric tests are used to compare whether the values reported for each variable 
are significantly different in pre-crisis and crisis periods. 
4.1. Univariate Analysis 
In the univariate analysis we examine how credit spread and common pricing factors compare for 
the three types of financing instruments. The purpose is to provide insight into the common pricing 
characteristics associated with SF and SDF instruments. In short, Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 are 
tested with respect to SF and SDF pricing. Table 4 provides t-tests and Fisher's exact tests comparing the 
values of each variable in AS bonds full sample with the corresponding values in the PF loans full 
sample; the values of each variable in AS bonds full sample with the corresponding values in the CB full 
sample; and the values of each variable in PF loans full sample with the corresponding values in the CB 
full sample. The figures in the table are t-statistics for continuous variables and p-values for dummy 
variables. Almost all of the pair-wise comparisons indicate statistically significant differences between 
the common pricing variables associated with PF, AS, and CB issues. 
The relative pricing of SF (PF and AS issues) versus SDF (CB issues) issues is one of the most 
important findings detailed in Tables 3 and 4. Average credit spreads are economically and statistically 
higher for PF loans (198.3 bps) than they are for AS bonds (148.9 bps) and CB (157.6 bps). On the 
contrary, average credit spreads for AS and CB issues do not differ significantly at 5% significance 
level.
26
 Therefore, we accept only the hypothesis that the credit spread on SF is lower than or equal to the 
credit spread on SDF for AS issues (Hypothesis 2). Our findings diverge from those presented by Hu and 
Cantor (2006) and Maris and Segal (2002), which state that securitization securities credit spreads have 
been higher than corporate bond credit spreads. If we compare the average spread exhibited in Table 3 
with the average spread exhibited by PF loans and all syndicated loans in the study of Kleimeier and 
Megginson (2000), we notice that PF loans in Western Europe have higher average spread (198.3 bps 
versus 130 bps) and that PF, AS, and CB issues have higher average spread in comparison with the spread 
for all syndicated loans (134 bps). Even if we compare the average credit spread for PF loans exhibited in 
our study without the adjustment for the risk difference of the bond and loan benchmarks (31 bps during 
our sample period) we continue to notice that PF loans in Western Europe have a higher average credit 
spread (167.3 bps versus 130 bps). However, based on recent samples, Corielli et al. (2010) and Gatti et 
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 Even when we split the samples into pre-crisis and crisis period (see Table 5), we find – using the Wilcoxon z-test 
– that the average credit spreads are significantly higher for PF loans than they are for AS and CB issues. 
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al. (2013) find a similar average spread for PF loans (171.8 bps and 169.18 bps, respectively). Vink and 
Thibeault (2008) present lower average spread for ABS (99.2 bps) and MBS (73.9 bps) in comparison 
with the average credit spread for AS bonds (148.9 bps) exhibited in our study. 
**** Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here **** 
The average credit rating for AS (4.3) and CB (4.9) issues is significantly lower than the credit 
rating for PF loans (7). This may suggest that PF transactions are more risky than other types of lending. 
However, this can reflect the country rating, since PF loan borrowers are, on average, located in far riskier 
countries than in the case of any other issue category. The same pattern is presented by Kleimeier and 
Megginson (2000) when comparing PF loans with other syndicated loans. The average country rating for 
PF borrowers (2.1) is significantly higher than the corresponding value for AS bonds (1.3) and CB (1.4). 
Despite a similar average country rating presented for AS bonds and CB they are statistically different at 
the 5% level or greater. When comparing SF with SDF bonds, we conclude that the average credit rating 
for AS bonds is significantly lower than the average credit rating for CB issues. 
The observed level of management fees and the number of participating banks do provide indirect 
evidence that PF lending may be considered relatively more risky than other types of lending. The 
average level of management fees for PF loans (49.0 bps) is significantly higher than the level for AS 
(33.1 bps) and CB (22.7 bps) issues. The average number of banks participating in PF loans is 6.9 and is 
significantly larger than the average of 2.4 for AS bonds and 2.9 for CB. These findings suggest that 
banks wish to increase the number of institutions participating in a PF credit of a given size in order to 
spread risks over a large number of banks. AS bonds have the lowest average number of bookrunners 
(1.4), which differ significantly from the average number of bookrunners in CB (1.6) and PF (2.1) issues. 
PF lending exhibits the lowest average tranche size of 116.2 M€, less than the 182.9 M€ and 
159.7 M€ average tranche size exhibited by AS and CB issues, respectively. This can be explained by the 
fact that PF is typically loan based or buy-and-hold project bond based. However, the average tranche size 
exhibited by AS bonds does not differ significantly at the 5% significance level from the average tranche 
size exhibited by CB issues. If we compare the average tranche size exhibited in Table 3 for AS bonds 
with the average loan tranche presented by Vink and Thibeault (2008), we notice that it is relatively large 
when compared to 150.3 M€ and 209.6 M€ for ABS and MBS, respectively. The same pattern is observed 
when we compare AS and CB issues average tranche sizes in our study with the average tranche size of 
$203 million verified for all syndicated loans reported by Kleimeier and Megginson (2000). 
Currency risk clearly suggests that AS bond issues are often similar to CB issues, but otherwise 
fundamentally different financial instruments from PF loans. PF loans in Western Europe are much less 





 Most of the non-price variables detailed in Table 3 clearly suggest that PF, AS, and CB 
issues are fundamentally different financial instruments. A far lower fraction of CB issues are arranged 
for U.K. borrowers (13.5%) than for PF loans (21.2%) and AS bonds (48.7%). CB issues are much more 
likely to come from borrowers/issuers in the financial industry (80.8%) than SF transactions (0.4% for PF 
loans and 74.1% for AS bonds). Additionally, a significantly larger number of tranches per transaction are 
issued in a CB transaction. In a typical CB transaction, the average number of tranches per transaction is 
18.4, which is larger than the average number of 2.9 for PF loans and 4.5 for AS bonds. However, this 
number requires further analysis. The average number of tranches in the CB high-information sample 
falls significantly to 1.8, while it remains similar for PF (3) and AS (4.2) issues. Additionally, the average 
loan to value ratio – the ratio of the tranche size to the transaction size – for AS bonds (36.4%) and PF 
loans (47.3%) is significantly lower than the loan to value ratio for CB (61.8%). Thus, we can conclude 
that SF transactions may benefit from tranching to a larger degree. 
An AS tranche of average size matures over just 20.9 years, which is a long period if we compare 
it with the average 13.6 and 5.3 years for PF and CB tranches, respectively.
28
 Still AS issues, as indicated 
by the standard deviation, exhibit significant heterogeneity with respect to maturity. For example, 
standard deviation for maturity of AS issues is 14.8 years, while it is 9.3 and 5.9 years for PF and CB 
issues, respectively. The difference can be explained by the fact that certain types of assets underlying an 
AS structure have long maturities (e.g., residential mortgage loans). In general, the cash flow profile of 
the underlying assets is closely related to the maturity of the SF transactions. Finally, a significantly 
larger fraction of CB issues are fixed rate (79%) compared to the full sample of PF loans (1.4%) and AS 
bonds (24.9%). 
Before proceeding to the next section, we will briefly summarize the results of our univariate 
comparison between SF and SDF issues. We found that most of the common pricing characteristics in 
fact differ significantly, not only between SF and SDF issues but also among SF transactions. Table 4 
shows that all pair-wise comparisons indicate statistically significant differences in value, with the 
exception of credit spread, tranche size, and currency risk between AS and CB issues. Therefore, we 
accept Hypothesis 1 that pricing factors of SF credit spreads differ significantly from the pricing factors 
of SDF credit spreads. Additionally, we also find that the common pricing characteristics among SF 
tranches (PF loans and AS bonds) do differ significantly. Considering the financial instruments studied as 
a whole, we have documented that the warranties and transaction structures differ between the three types 
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 If we compare the percentage of PF loan tranches subject to currency risk exhibited in Table 3, 11%, with the 
percentage exhibited in Gatti et al. (2013), 47%, we notice that PF loans in Western Europe are much less likely to 
be subject to currency risk. 
28
 The mean loan maturity of PF loans is 8.6 and 8.7 years in Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) and Gatti et al. 
(2013), respectively. A higher average maturity of 10.5 years is presented by Corielli et al. (2010). 
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of loan issues, but that there are also important univariate differences to consider, namely: (i) PF loans’ 
average credit spreads are significantly higher than they are for AS and CB issues; (ii) Both AS and CB 
issues have a significant higher tranche size in comparison with PF loans; (iii) AS bonds have much 
longer average maturity and are more likely to be arranged for U.K. borrowers than PF and CB issues; 
(iv) PF lending may be considered relatively more risky because either the average level of management 
fee or the average number of banks participating are significantly larger than the average for AS and CB 
issues; (v) PF loans are much less likely to be subject to currency risk and borrowers are, on average, 
located in far riskier countries than in the case of any other issue category; and (vi) CB issues are more 
likely to be fixed rate rather than floating rate operations, when compared with AS and PF tranches. 
We will examine loan pricing to a greater extent in section 5, when we employ OLS regression to 
determine what factors influence SF and SDF transactions’ credit spreads. However, our results indicate 
that the common pricing characteristics differ significantly in value between the three types of loan issues. 
Therefore, we would expect the impact on pricing to be loan-specific. 
4.2. The impact of the Financial Crisis on Credit Spreads and Pricing Factors 
Until 2008, SF loan and bond issues had been progressively growing (in volume), however the 
2007/2008 global financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis led to a drop in 
sponsor/issuer interest. Similar to sponsors/issuers, lenders might have also changed their attitude in terms 
of pricing and compensation. We are therefore investigating whether our univariate results are robust over 
time considering a pre-crisis period from January 1
st
, 2000 through to September 14
th
, 2008, and a crisis 
period from September 15
th





We hypothesize (Hypothesis 4) that, after controlling for macroeconomic conditions and loan 
characteristics, the financial crisis impact significantly on SF and SDF credit spreads. Thus, it is 
important to understand if the 2007/2008 financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt 
crisis impact significantly not only on credit spread but also on the common pricing factors of loans and 
bonds. We use a non-parametric test (Wilcoxon z-test for continuous variables and Fisher's exact test for 
dummy variables) to compare whether the values reported for each variable are significantly different in 
the two periods. Table 5 provides z-tests comparing the values for two sub-samples: pre-crisis period sub-
sample and crisis period sub-sample. The numbers are z-statistics and almost all of the pair-wise 
comparisons indicate that equality of means for continuous variables can be rejected for PF, AS, and CB 
issues. The only exceptions are the average credit rating for PF loans and AS bonds, the average loan to 
value for AS bonds, and the average management fee for CB issues. Similar findings are presented in 
Table 6 for dummy variables, which strongly support that, the proportion of tranches for which dummy = 




, 2008 is the Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy filing date, commonly regarded as the major milestone 
of the 2007/2008 global financial crisis. 
20 
 
1 differ significantly between the two sub-samples. The exceptions are the guarantee for PF loans, fixed 
rate issue for PF loans and AS bonds, and financial institutions for PF loans. 
**** Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here **** 
The evidence regarding credit spread strongly supports the assumption that the average credit 
spread is significantly higher for PF loans (329.1 bps versus 136.9 bps), AS bonds (206.5 bps versus 
143.5 bps), and CB issues (220.3 bps versus 125.5) during the crisis period. Thus, we accept the 
hypothesis that the crisis impact significantly on SF and SDF credit spreads. These simple sample 
analyses, however, do not allow us to control for other micro and macro pricing factors. We thus proceed, 
in section 5, with regression analyses where we can take these factors directly into account. 
Contrary to PF loans, AS bonds and CB issues average maturities and tranche sizes have 
increased significantly during the crisis period. However, it is important to notice that the market for AS 
has gone through a structural change. During the crisis, banks have underwritten their own securitization 
programs to use them as a guarantee for obtaining resources in the auctions of the European Central 
Bank; i.e., to create collateral for repo transactions. Additionally, our result regarding the average credit 
rating for AS bonds is a bit puzzling. Anecdotal evidence tends to suggest that AS bonds issued during 
the crisis period may be of higher quality due to the increasing scrutiny and tight credit rationing. We do 
not support this idea since we accept the null hypothesis of equality of means for credit rating. 
Taking the remaining variables, we are able to document the following important findings: (i) CB 
issues have a significantly lower credit rating during the crisis period in comparison with the pre-crisis 
period; (ii) during the crisis period, loans and bonds in Western Europe are located in far riskier 
countries;
30
 (iii) PF issues are more likely to have a higher average number of tranches and bookrunners 
during the crisis period than during the pre-crisis period, when compared with AS bonds; (iv) during the 
crisis period, all types of issues were much less likely to be subject to currency risk; and (v) during the 
crisis period issuers belonging to the financial industry increased their use of SF instruments, namely AS 
bonds, as compared with SDF instruments: 72.1% of the AS tranches were issued by financial institutions 
during the pre-crisis period, compared to 100% in the crisis period (85.5% versus 62.7% for CB). 
5. The Determinants of Credit Spreads for SF and SDF transactions 
In this section, we subject the various high-information samples to OLS regression analysis. Our 
purposes for employing OLS regression are four-fold. First, we intend to determine which of the variables 
have significant and independent effect on credit spreads once the effects of other variables are accounted 
for. We hypothesized (Hypothesis 3) that the impact of pricing factors on credit spread differs 
significantly between SF and SDF transactions. Thus, we start our analysis by determining if SF and SDF 
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 This can be explained by the European sovereign debt crisis, which has made it difficult or impossible for some 
countries to re-finance their government debt without the assistance of third parties. 
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transactions are priced in the same way, which is equivalent to testing whether PF, AS, and CB issues are 
priced in segmented or integrated capital markets. Second, we aim to determine whether SF transactions 
are more or less expensive than SDF transactions, after controlling for other factors (Hypothesis 2). Third, 
we intend to determine whether the 2007/2008 financial crisis impacted significantly on SF and SDF 
credit spreads – again, after controlling for other micro and macro pricing factors (Hypothesis 4). Finally, 
the term structure of SF, as well as of SDF transactions appears as a particular puzzle. Therefore, we aim 
to analyze the pricing of our cross section dataset of loan and bond issues within a multivariate regression 
framework, focusing on the relationship between credit spread and maturity, while controlling for other 
relevant micro and macro risk factors that affect also the credit spread (Hypothesis 5). 
The academic literature contains numerous loan pricing studies, both theoretical and empirical. 
Compared with the large amount of empirical studies on CB credit spreads, research on AS bond and PF 
loan credit spreads has been scant. Virtually all of the empirical studies on CB credit spreads have found 
credit ratings to be one of its most important determinants. Some of the more recent papers include Duffie 
and Singleton (1999), Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001), Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann 
(2001), Hull, Predescu, and White (2004), Gabbi and Sironi (2005), and Longstaff et al. (2005). In 
searching for determinants of CB credit spreads, researchers also found other factors to be important, like 
liquidity [Longstaff et al. (2005), Chen et al. (2007), and Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011)], systematic risk 
[Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) and Elton et al. (2001)], incomplete accounting information [Flannery et al. 
(2012)], leverage [Flannery et al. (2012)], and taxes [Elton et al. (2001)]. Market variables, like the level 
of interest rates, the slope of the yield curve, and market volatility, also have a significant impact on CB 
credit spreads [Campbell and Taksler (2003) and Krishnan, Ritchken, and Thomson (2005)]. An 
important stream of the literature analyzes the relationship between spread and maturity. Several authors 
[e.g., Jones et al. (1984), Sarig and Warga (1989), Duffie and Singleton (2001), and Sorge and Gadanecz 
(2008)] argue that on average, the term structure of credit spreads for investment grade bonds appears 
upward-sloping. However, the literature has been more controversial regarding the term structure of credit 
spreads for non-investment grade bonds [e.g., Fons (1987), Sarig and Warga (1989), and Helwege and 
Turner (1999)]. 
Referring to AS bonds, Rothberg, Nothaft, and Gabriel (1989) argue that liquidity and credit risk 
significantly affect the pricing of pass-through securities. Maris and Segal (2002) study the determinants 
of credit spread on CMBS and find that (i) default probability, (ii) tranche size, (iii) transaction size, and 
(iv) year influence CMBS credit spreads. Ammer and Clinton (2004) find that rating downgrades are 
accompanied by negative returns and widening spreads. Firla-Cuchra (2005) argues that credit rating is 
the most important pricing factor for this asset class at issue. This idea is corroborated by Gorton and 
Souleles (2005), Hu and Cantor (2006), Vink and Thibeault (2008), and Buscaino, Caselli, Corielli, and 
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Gatti (2012). Vink and Thibeault (2008) examine how common pricing factors compare for ABS, MBS 
and CDO. They find that not only the common pricing factors differ significantly between the main 
classes of issues but also that ABS, MBS and CDO are influenced differently by common pricing factors. 
Concerning PF loans, Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) find that PF loan spreads are directly 
related to variables such as country risk, the use of covenants in the loan contract, and project leverage. In 
their paper, they conclude that a third-party guarantee significantly reduces PF loan spreads, while PF 
loan pricing is not a positive function of maturity and loan size. Sorge and Gadanecz (2008) detect that 
whereas credit spreads for both investment-grade and speculative-grade bonds other than PF are a positive 
linear function of maturity, in PF loans the term structure of credit spreads is ‘hump-shaped’. Further 
evidence on pricing of PF loans is provided by Corielli et al. (2010), who demonstrate that lenders rely 
upon the network of nonfinancial contracts as a mechanism to control agency costs and project risks. 
Blanc-Brude and Strange (2007) argue that, in a PF transaction, lenders should price any risk that is not 
explicitly managed through contracts. Syndication also plays a role in driving the credit spreads in PF 
loans. Esty and Megginson (2000, 2003) show a positive relationship between syndicate size (and 
concentration) and loan pricing. On the contrary, Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) and Sorge and 
Gadanecz (2008) report that the presence of larger syndicates reduces credit spreads. Esty (2004a) shows 
that both legal and financial systems influence the pricing of PF loans. Gatti et al. (2013) show that 
certification can create economic value by reducing loan spreads. 
We estimate the determinants of loans and bonds pricing using the model described in equation 
[1]. The dependent variable is the ex ante credit spread, in basis points, and the independent variables are 
those presented and described in Table 7, which gives an overview of the variables and their expected 
sign, taking into consideration the existing empirical literature. 
**** Insert Table 7 about here **** 
We employ standard OLS regression techniques and adjust for heteroskedasticity using the 
methodology proposed by Huber (1967) and White (1980).
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 We use the Huber-White-sandwich estimator of the variance of the linear regression estimator. The names Huber 
and White refer to the seminal references for this estimator: Huber (1967) and White (1980). For further discussion 































5.1. Determinants of Credit Spreads for the High-Information SF and SDF Samples 
A Chow test of structural change is used to investigate whether the credit spreads associated with 
SF and SDF issues are influenced differently by common pricing factors (Hypothesis 3). In essence, we 
are testing whether the pricing factors used in equation [1] are significant in both SF and SDF transactions 
and, if so, whether they have the same coefficient values. When running the OLS regressions for 
computing Chow statistics we adjusted for heteroskedasticity using the methodology proposed by Huber 
(1967) and White (1980). Hypothesis 3 is accepted because the Chow test statistics in Table 8 are all 
higher than the critical levels. The credit spread associated with PF, AS, and CB issues are influenced 
differently by common pricing factors. From our analysis, we conclude that: (i) SF and SDF transactions 
are distinct financial instruments; and (ii) PF loans and AS bonds are financial instruments influenced 
differently by common pricing factors. Hence, they are not priced in a single integrated market and we 
cannot estimate the full sample of loans and bonds in a single regression. 
**** Insert Table 8 about here **** 
Considering that we accept Hypothesis 3, next we examine the determinants of credit spreads for 
each type of issue using OLS regression framework. Table 9 presents the results of estimating equation 
[1] using each of the three high-information samples discussed in section 3. The regression intercepts for 
each type of loan issue show – although a direct comparison is not possible since some of the variables 
are omitted because of collinearity in estimating model [1a] –, as pointed out in the univariate analysis 
(Tables 3), the highest credit spread for PF loans in Western Europe when compared to AS and CB 
issues. This result, coupled with the univariate test results (Table 4), shows that PF loans have 
significantly higher credit spreads than AS and CB issues. These findings are contrary to those of 
Kleimeier and Megginson (2000), who find that PF loans have significantly lower spreads than other 
syndicated loans (corporate control; capital structure; and general corporate purpose). However, this is in 
line with the prediction of Fabozzi et al. (2006) and Gatti (2008), who present higher costs of borrowing 
when compared to conventional financing as one of the major disadvantages of PF transactions; i.e., they 
are costly to set up, take a long time to execute, and are highly restrictive once in place. 
**** Insert Table 9 about here **** 
The second line of Table 9 details the influence of transaction size on credit spread, which is 
insignificant for AS but negative and significant for PF and CB. This suggests that increasing the 
transaction size by 100 M€ will reduce the required credit spread by 89.89 basis points (bps) and 44.35 
bps for PF loans and CB, respectively. One could interpret this significant negative relationship between 
transaction size and credit spread as evidence of a positive price liquidity effect related to the size of the 
entire issue. Loan to value ratio behaves differently for PF loans than for AS and CB issues. Whereas 
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spread and loan to value are significantly, positively related for PF loans, they have a significant negative 
relationship for AS and CB transactions. These results are in line with the expected coefficient sign for PF 
and AS issues. AS bonds demonstrate a larger coefficient compared to PF loans, which means that lenders 
associate an increase in the loan to value ratio with a significant reduction of credit risk for AS securities. 
While credit spread and maturity are significantly, negatively related for CB issues, they show an 
insignificant relationship for PF and AS issues. The coefficient value indicates that issuing a CB, with an 
original maturity one year longer than the mean, decreases credit spread by 1.14 bps. However, this will 
be the subject of further analysis because our robustness checks (section 6) appear to confirm that 
maturity may be an endogenous variable in the pricing of CB and PF loans. Similarly, the number of 
tranches has an insignificant relationship with credit spread across SF transactions, but significant for CB 
issues. Thus, we do not find any evidence that issuers exploit market factors to their advantage via 
tranching of AS bonds. For CB issues, as expected, riskier transactions imply a higher number of tranches 
as each investor is available to constitute a lower share in their portfolio; i.e., an issuer will benefit from 
more tranches in the transaction especially in the situation of a higher degree of information asymmetry. 
The variable number of banks behaves differently for PF loans as compared with for AS and CB 
issues. While credit spread and number of banks are positively, significantly related for PF loans, they 
have a significantly negative relationship for AS and CB issues. The need for a higher number of banks in 
arranging a PF transaction can possibly be associated with an increase in risk and thus an extra premium 
is demanded. For AS and CB issues, a larger number of banks involved is able to lower the spread once 
investors associate a larger number of banks with an increase in the certification of the transaction. 
The country risk variable is significantly positive for PF loans, indicating that lending to a 
borrower located in a country with a rating of BB+ (BB+=11) versus one with a rating of AAA (AAA=1) 
will increase loans credit spread by 77.80 bps. Contrary to what we expected, based on empirical 
literature [Kleimeier and Megginson (2000)], currency risk dummy has a significant, positive relationship 
with the credit spread for PF loans. This finding for Western European PF transactions suggests that a 
mismatch in the currency of the borrower’s home country and the currency of the PF loan repayment, 
significantly increases the rate charged on an average loan by 38.11 bps. We expected U.K. borrowers to 
raise funds at a lower spread compared to borrowers from continental Europe, to the extent that the U.K. 
financial market is more developed and deeper than the continental Europe financial market. However, 
U.K. borrowers’ dummy variable is significantly positive for both PF and CB issues, indicating that 
lending to a borrower located in U.K. versus one in Continental Europe will increase credit spreads by 
49.85 bps and 19.39 bps for PF and CB issues, respectively. 
As expected, the 2007/2008 financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis 
have imposed a significant increase in credit spreads of all the types of financing. A transaction with the 
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issue date or active date belonging to the crisis period will have a higher average credit spread of 174.01 
bps, 121.25 bps, and 128.24 bps for PF, AS, and CB issues, respectively. 
The risk free rate has an insignificant relationship with AS bond credit spreads, but a significantly 
negative relationship with PF loan credit spreads. For CB issues, as expected, the higher the general level 
of interest rates the higher the credit spread. Our findings for PF loans differ from those of Blanc-Brude 
and Strange (2007), who find for a sample of EU and UK Public-Private Partnerships that risk-free rate 
variable proves to have no statistically significance on the pricing of PF tranches. As we expected, credit 
spread and the slope of the Euro swap curve – EUSA5y-Libor3M – are significantly and negatively related 
for SF transactions; i.e., a steeper Euro swap curve is associated with lower credit spreads. This suggests 
that SF credit spreads contain strong systematic risk components. On the contrary, the relationship 
between credit spreads and the slope of the Euro swap curve is insignificant for SDF transactions. Our 
results are in line with those of Hu and Cantor (2006), but contrary to those of Sorge and Gadanecz 
(2008). The variable volatility behaves differently for PF loans than for AS and CB issues. Credit spread 
and volatility are significantly and positively related for AS and CB issues, but they have an insignificant 
relationship for PF loans. In the presence of higher volatility, AS and CB issuers will pay a higher return. 
These findings are in line with those presented by Chen et al. (2007) and Flannery et al. (2012) for CB. 
The last six variables are dummy variables resulting from the categorical variable sector. The 
control group includes financial institutions. Thus, the interpretation of the coefficients for sector dummy 
variables (Commercial, Industrial, Utilities, Transportation, Government, and Other) occurs with 
reference to that omitted variable. We discover, in line with Corielli et al. (2010), that sector does not 
influence the level of credit spreads in PF transactions. While the commercial dummy variable has a 
significantly positive relationship with AS bond credit spreads, industrial, utilities, and transportation 
dummy variables have insignificant coefficients. This means that in model [1b] the predicted credit 
spread is approximately 108.80 bps higher for issuers belonging to the commercial sector than in the 
financial industry. For CB issues, and with the exception of the government dummy variable, all other 
sector dummy variables have predicted credit spreads higher than those for the financial industry. 
DealScan and DCM Analytics databases provide varying information about individual loans and 
bond issues, respectively. Depending upon factors such as sector, borrower nationality, the facility type 
for PF loans and factors such as deal type, sector, issuer nationality, and issue type for AS and CB issues, 
databases provide varying amounts of information. Thus, information on credit rating, pointed out by 
several authors as the most important pricing factor for AS and CB tranches at issue, is available only for 
some of the transactions belonging to our high-information sub-samples. Next we study the determinants 




5.2. The Impact of Credit Risk on SF and SDF Credit Spreads 
It is difficult to obtain credit risk information for PF loans. This is because the information about 
the credit rating for PF loans at closing date provided by DealScan is scant when compared with the credit 
rating information provided by DCM Analytics database for AS and CB issues. Models [2a], [2b], and 
[2c] present loan pricing regression results for a sample of 39 PF loans, 364 AS bonds, and 8,686 CB with 
a credit rating at closing date from either S&P or Moody’s. We compare these results with those obtained 
from the estimation of equation [1], using each of the three high-information samples (models [1a], [1b], 
and [1c]). Table 10 shows exactly the results expected; i.e., the higher the credit risk of the borrower or 
issuer the higher the credit spread. A one unit increase in credit rating (corresponding to a downgrade 
from AAA to AA+) is associated with an increase of 7.14 bps, 27.44 bps, and 29.27 bps in PF, AS, and 
CB issues credit spread, respectively. The inclusion of a direct measure of credit risk has a considerable 
impact on the regressions intercept, causing a reduction of 213.51 bps for PF loans, 100.17 bps for AS 
bonds, and 218.77 bps for CB. 
**** Insert Table 10 about here **** 
Considering SDF (CB) issues, model [2c] yields an adjusted R
2
 value of 0.44, which compares 
with a value of 0.22 for model [1c]. This shows, as referred virtually by all of the empirical studies on 
CB, that credit ratings are one of the most important determinants of CB credit spreads. Comparing the 
results presented in model [2c] with those presented in model [1c], important differences either in 
significance and size of the coefficients can be pointed out, namely: (i) the coefficients on log transaction 
size, U.K. borrowers, and industrial and transportation dummy variables become insignificant; (ii) 
currency risk (as we expected) and government dummy variable become significantly and positively 
related with credit spread; (iii) the sign of the impact of the time to maturity on credit spread changes 
between regressions, i.e., in model [1c] maturity is significantly negative and becomes significantly 
positive in model [2c], as we expected based on empirical literature – for CB issues with rating, a one-
year increase in maturity is associated with a 1.10 bps increase in credit spread; (iv) the sign of the impact 
of the log loan to value on credit spread also changes between regressions – in model [1c] the loan to 
value ratio is significantly negative and becomes significantly positive in model [2c], which is in line with 
the existing literature; (v) a change in coefficient sign takes place for EUSA5y-Libor3M variable – for CB 
issues with rating, as expected based on empirical literature, the slope of the Euro swap curve 
significantly reduces a CB issue credit spread; and (vi) a change in coefficient sign also takes place for 
commercial and utilities dummy variables – when controlling for rating, issuers belonging to the 
commercial and utilities industry pay lower credit spreads than issuers in the financial industry. 
Results in estimating model [2b] show, as we expected based on the existing empirical literature, 
that variables number of banks and EUSA5y-Libor3M significantly reduce the credit spread. The 
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coefficients on log loan to value and commercial dummy variables become insignificant, while volatility 
and transportation dummy variable both are significantly and positively related to credit spread. 
However, the change in significance of the coefficient on log loan to value is of little importance to the 
extent that the loan to value ratio tends to be similar per rating class. The inclusion of a direct measure of 
credit risk has a considerable impact on the significance of the coefficient on crisis. Contrary to what we 
expected, credit spread and crisis show an insignificant relationship for AS bonds. This can be explained 
by the significant reduction in the number of observations between pre-crisis and crisis period sub-
samples – from 334 to 30 observations (see 4.3). As the result of the credit crunch precipitated by the 
subprime mortgage crisis the market for AS bonds was very weak in the crisis period. Additionally, banks 
have issued government guaranteed bonds and underwritten their own securitization programs to use 
them as a guarantee for obtaining resources in the two ECB covered bond purchase programmes, 
implemented from the second half of 2009.
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 The adjusted R
2
 value increases from 0.19 to 0.46 ([1b] 
versus [2b]). Our findings are in line with empirical studies, which found rating to be one of the most 
important determinants of AS bond credit spreads. 
For PF loans (model [2a]), industrial dummy variable becomes significantly and positively 
related with credit spread. Coefficients on log transaction size, log loan to value, number of banks, 
country risk, currency risk, U.K. borrowers, crisis, risk free rate, and EUSA5y-Libor3M become 
insignificant. Thus, the credit spread is basically explained by credit risk. It is also important to notice that 
this change in coefficients is also related to the significant reduction in the number of observations 
between models [1a] and [2a] – from 1,029 to 39 observations –, which implies that significant precaution 
is needed in the analysis of the results for PF loans when we include the rating variable. 
5.3. The Impact of the Financial Crisis on SF and SDF Credit Spreads 
In order to test the impact of the 2007/2008 financial crisis and the subsequent European 
sovereign debt crisis on SF and SDF credit spreads, we hypothesize (Hypothesis 4) that after controlling 
for macroeconomic conditions and loan characteristics, the financial crisis did have a significant impact 
on SF and SDF credit spreads. Our purpose is to examine whether our results are robust over time by 
considering a pre-crisis period from January 1
st
, 2000 through to September 14
th
, 2008, and a crisis period 
from September 15
th
, 2008 through to December 31
st
, 2011. 
Model [1a] – Table 11 – for both pre-crisis and crisis period shows exactly the results expected; 
i.e., PF loans credit spreads have increased significantly during the crisis period. The split of our PF loans 
sample has a considerable impact on the regressions intercept, causing an increase of 342.96 bps between 
pre-crisis and crisis sub-samples. The coefficients of the log transaction size, risk free rate and EUSA5y-
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 Under Covered Bond Purchase Programme, the Eurosystem made outright purchases of covered bonds to the 
nominal value of Euro 60 billion and Euro 40 billion, respectively. See Beirne et al. (2011) for further details. 
28 
 
Libor3M remain (when comparing regression results for pre-crisis and crisis sub-samples) significantly, 
negatively related to credit spread. Similarly, the coefficient of the U.K. borrowers remains significantly, 
positively related to credit spread. It is important to notice that all the referred coefficients increased their 
values. Coefficient of maturity, number of banks, currency risk and volatility become insignificant. 
Finally, variables’ log loan to value, country risk and industrial and utilities dummy variables become 
significantly, positively related to credit spread. Thus, we can identify a change in the type of factors that 
explain PF loan credit spreads, from marketability factors (maturity and number of banks) to default 
factors (loan to value and country risk). The statistical significance of log loan to value might be 
explained by the fact that a higher loan to value ratio means greater risk for lenders since that loan 
constitutes a larger share in their loan portfolio. Additionally, during the crisis period banks lost balance 
sheet capacity to lend. The significant and positive relationship between country risk and credit spread 
during the crisis period is not a surprise, since rating agencies downgraded sovereign bond ratings from 
several Western European countries (e.g., Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). 
**** Insert Table 11 about here **** 
For AS bonds (model [2b] for pre-crisis and crisis sub-samples), none of the coefficients are 
statistically significant for the crisis period. This can be explained by the significant reduction in the 
number of observations of model [2b] for crisis period. Unfortunately, the small number of observations 
for AS transactions during the crisis period does not allow for an in-depth analysis. We believe that this 
result presents an important opportunity for future research. 
With respect to SDF (CB) issues (model [2c]), the coefficients of maturity, currency risk, 
volatility, EUSA5y-Libor3M, utilities dummy variable, and rating remain statistically significant, while 
the coefficients of log loan to value, number of banks and other dummy variables become insignificant. 
On the contrary, commercial and industrial dummy variables become significantly, negatively related 
with credit spread, which means that during the crisis period issuers in the financial sector pay higher 
credit spreads than in commercial and industrial sectors. A change in coefficient signs takes place for five 
variables. As for PF loans, variables of U.K. borrowers and country risk are significantly and positively 
related to CB issue credit spreads during the crisis period. Log transaction size variable becomes 
significantly, positively related to credit spread while the number of tranches and risk free rate become 
significantly, negatively related to credit spread. The change in sign for transaction size and number of 
tranches could be explained by a liquidity shortfall in financial markets. The critical phase of the 
2007/2008 financial crisis manifested a shortage of liquidity, which was reflected in a fall in asset prices 
below their long run fundamental price and deterioration in external financing conditions. U.K. 
borrowers’ dummy variable becomes significantly, positively related to CB issue credit spreads during the 
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crisis period because the resulting liquidity problems strongly affected U.K. financial institutions, which 
issued almost 50% of all CB issued in the U.K. during this period. 
Based on our regression analysis, we find further evidence in favor of Hypothesis 4, as the 
2007/2008 financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis does have a significant 
impact on PF and CB issues credit spread. Thus, the financial crisis substantially influenced the 
explanatory power of the regressions, as well as the coefficients of the macro and micro pricing factors (in 
sign and in significance) both for SF and SDF transactions. 
5.4. The Term Structure of SF and SDF Transactions 
As presented in section 4, time to maturity differs significantly between PF, AS, and CB issues at 
the 5% significance level. An AS tranche of average size matures just over 20.9 years, which is a long 
period if we compare this with the average 13.6 and 5.3 years for PF and CB tranches, respectively. SF 
transactions are thus characterized by much longer maturities compared to other forms of financing. We 
intend to determine whether longer maturities are perceived by lenders as a risk per se; i.e., if the term 
structure of credit spreads for SF issues behave differently from that of SDF issues (Hypothesis 5). 
Based on presented regression results for SF and SDF issues in section 5, a linear positive 
relationship between credit spread and maturity appears strongly significant for SDF transactions (CB 
issues) – see model [2c] –, in line with the intuition that lenders should get a higher remuneration for 
being exposed to risk for a longer period of time, and insignificant for SF transactions (PF loans and AS 
bonds) – see models [1a], [2a], [1b], and [2b]. Thus, our main conclusion so far is that, when controlling 
for other micro and macro risk factors, a linear positive relationship between spread and maturity shows 
up as very significant for SDF transactions. This is demonstrated in Graphs 1 and 2. For SF transactions, 
the empirical results reported in other studies lead us to verify the hypothesis of a hump-shaped term 
structure of credit spreads for PF loans [Sorge and Gadanecz (2008] and a negative relationship for AS 
bonds [Vink and Thibeault (2008)]. We therefore augment our baseline multiple regression (equation [1]) 
with non-linear maturity components. 
Table 12 reports regression results where the natural logarithm of maturity – log maturity – is 
included as an additional regressor in the models to test for the presence of any non-linear effects of 
maturity on credit spread form for SDF and SF samples.
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 The results show that both the explanatory 
power of regressions, as well as the coefficients on the macro and micro pricing factors (in sign and in 
significance) are largely the same for AS and CB issues (models [3b] and [3c]), as in the original 
specifications. However, considering PF loans, the explanatory power (adjusted R
2
) increases 
significantly from model [1a] to [3a] – from 0.51 to 0.63. For PF loans, a robust hump-shaped 
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for this work and therefore are not reported. 
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relationship between credit spread and maturity is found, as plotted in Graphs 3 and 4. Our findings are 
similar to those presented by Sorge and Gadanecz (2008), who show a hump-shaped term structure of 
credit spreads for PF loans. In PF, projects usually start by generating revenues after a relatively long 
construction period. As loan repayment relies primarily on the project’s cash flows, obtaining credit for 
longer maturities might be critical to ensure a project’s financial viability. This short-term liquidity risk 
may explain why a standard upward-sloping relationship between maturity and credit spread do not apply 
to PF, as is the case for CB. Additionally, project lenders usually exercise a much more active control and 
supervision over the project’s advancement in PF transactions. 
**** Insert Table 12 about here **** 
In model [3b] the logarithmic maturity term turns out insignificant for AS bonds, which is in line 
with our previous results and with the relationship between credit spread and maturity plotted in Graph 5. 
If we analyze the augmented component-plus-residual plot shown in Graph 6 – based on model [3b] – we 
can conclude that there is a negative relationship, although not significant, between credit spread and 
maturity. Further empirical analysis of this question would be beneficial, by using a database with a 
higher number of observations.
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 The insignificant linear relationship between credit spread and maturity 
can be easily explained by the intrinsic characteristics of AS transactions. Contrary to traditional secured 
bonds, where the ability of the originator (or issuer) to generate sufficient cash flows to service the debt 
determines the risks of the transaction, in securitization the source of repayments/funds shifts from the 
cash flows of the issuer to the assets and cash flows pledged as collateral to the issue. Therefore, the 
maturity of the securities issued in an AS transaction typically matches the maturity of the assets used as 
collateral. Finally, the negative slope of the straight line in Graph 6 can be explained by the term structure 
of credit spreads shown by different AS instruments. Certain types of assets underlying an AS structure 
adjust more easily to issues with longer maturity levels. An MBS tranche of average size has a maturity of 
30.31 years and an average credit spread of 115.64 bps, compared with a maturity of 17.29 years and to a 
credit spread of 162.01 bps for ABS. 
6. Robustness Checks 
6.1. Endogeneity 
We subsequently wish to check whether our results are affected by potential endogeneity of 
maturity. We could conceive the case of riskier borrowers only being able to obtain shorter-maturity PF 
loans or to issue shorter-maturity bonds; i.e., in fact, the choices of maturity and credit spread may be co-
determined. To perform this robustness check, we follow the approach in Wu (1973), also described in 
Davidson and MacKinnon (2004). We first run one auxiliary regression where maturity is expressed as a 
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 We have also run model [3b] for ABS and MBS sub-samples and we find interaction terms of maturity with credit 
spread to be insignificant in both linear and non-linear specifications. 
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function of all exogenous microeconomic and macroeconomic variables. We save the residuals and add to 
the list of independent variables in order to re-estimate our main regression models. More precisely, we 
estimate models [1a], [2b], and [2c] adding the residuals obtained from our auxiliary regression. We find 
that residuals are significant (at the 5% significance level) for PF loans and CB issues. In other words, we 
reject the null of no endogeneity of maturity for PF loans and CB issues but not in the case of AS bonds. 
This is consistent with the findings by Helwege and Turner (1999) and Sorge and Gadanecz (2008) for 
bonds but contrary with the findings by Sorge and Gadanecz (2008) for PF loans. Concerning AS bonds, 
since the maturity of the securities issued in an AS transaction is so closely tied to the maturity of the 
assets used as collateral, maturity can be considered as a pre-determined variable at the pricing stage. 
PF is by nature characterized by endogeneity problems [Esty (2004b), Corielli et al. (2010), and 
Gatti et al. (2013)] since SPV directors manage a large set of variables simultaneously. Considering that 
PF projects usually start by generating revenues after a relatively long construction period, obtaining 
credit for longer maturities and with affordable credit spreads might be critical to ensure a project’s 
financial viability. Regarding CB, bonds with longer maturities tend to be more risky, because 
predictability of future cash flows weakens with horizon. Therefore, investors usually demand higher 
premium for longer term bonds [Jones et al. (1984), Sarig and Warga (1989), and Sorge and Gadanecz 
(2008)]. As a result, the trade-off between spread and maturity is also taken into consideration for CB 
issues. We can thus assume that both credit spread and maturity are determined simultaneously once 
negotiations for the financial package begin. 
The structure so defined is then estimated by instrumental variables, and the choice of instruments 
is checked by using the Sargan test [Sargan (1958)].
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 In such a test, the residuals from a 2SLS regression 
are regressed on all the exogenous variables. Considering that PF loans and CB issues are priced in 
segmented capital markets (see section 5) we use different instruments for each type of transaction. We 
use models [1a] and [2c] where credit spread is modeled as a function of microeconomic and 
macroeconomic variables and the endogenous regressor maturity is instrumented with the following 
factors excluded from the equations: (i) tranche size and year for PF loans; (ii) and number of 
bookrunners and year for CB. 
We identified the possible variables to use as instruments based on opinions collected during 
verbal discussions with top investment banks, and the literature confirms our choices [see, e.g., Daniels, 
Ejara, and Vijayakumar (2010)]. The 2007-2008 financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign 
debt crisis manifested a shortage of liquidity, which was reflected in a maturity reduction for both loans 
and bonds. The year might thus affect maturity since during the crisis period banks/investors lost balance 
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 Sargan test is a test of overidentifying restrictions that allows us to assess the adequacy of the selected 
instruments. For further discussion of this subject see Baum (2006). 
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sheet capacity to lend, particularly for longer periods. The debt maturity literature regarding CB 
[Diamond (1991), Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Frame, and Miller (2005), and Bali and Skinner (2006)] 
emphasizes the importance of information asymmetry in the debt maturity decision for corporate firms. 
Hence, a larger number of bookrunners involved is able to increase maturity once investors associate a 
larger number of bookrunners with an increase in the certification of the transaction. Finally, for PF loans, 
it is feasible to associate maturity with tranche size. Larger tranches might imply lower maturities since 
they constitute a larger share in lenders’ loan portfolio. 
The F statistic reported in Table 13 is significant for models [4a] and [4c], which means that the 
additional instruments have significant explanatory power for maturity. In addition to the requirement that 
instrumental variables be correlated with maturity, the instruments must also be uncorrelated with the 
structural error term. Both Sargan’s test statistics are insignificant at the 5% test level, which means that 
our structural models are specified correctly. 
**** Insert Table 13 about here **** 
The augmented regressions reported in Table 13 provide consistent estimates of the coefficients, 
confirming our main results reported in Table 10. Comparing the results presented in model [4a] with 
those presented in model [1a], small differences in significance of the coefficients can be pointed out, 
namely: (i) the coefficients on log loan to value and U.K. borrowers dummy variable become 
insignificant; (ii) contrary to what we expected based on empirical literature, the number of tranches 
becomes significantly and negatively related with credit spread. Results in estimating model [4c] show 
that variables U.K. borrowers (as we expected), industrial and transportation dummy variables 
significantly reduce the credit spread. The coefficients on government and other dummy variables become 
insignificant, while the log transaction size is significantly and positively related to credit spread. 
Finally, we also check if the choices of credit risk (rating) and credit spread may be co-
determined. We follow the same approach and we find no evidence of endogeneity bias for PF, AS, and 
CB issues. This seems to suggest that if credit spreads and maturity appears co-determined for PF and CB 
transactions, the same does not hold for credit spreads and credit risk. 
6.2. Up-front and Management Fees 
Credit spreads are not the only measure of risk premium, because loans and bonds also carry fees 
that can be related to creditworthiness and performance. In the syndication market (PF loans) two types of 
fees are usually charged by lenders: (i) commitment or annual fees; and (ii) participation or upfront fees. 
In the bond market a type of fee is usually charged by underwriters: management fees, which are paid 
annually. As an additionally robustness check, we wish to test the sensitivity of our results to the 
inclusion of two variables in order to capture the impact of fees on SF and SDF credit spreads: (i) 
management fee (management fees for AS and CB issues and commitment or annual fees for PF loans); 
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and (ii) upfront fees (only available for PF loans). Our baseline models (equation [1]) were thus re-
estimated after adding these variables. 
For PF and CB issues, the coefficients on the management fee variable are significantly positive, 
suggesting that fees and spreads are complements. On average, each additional basis point increase in the 
management fee increases the credit spread by 0.85 bps and 0.51 bps for PF and CB issues, respectively. 
The logical interpretation of this finding for PF loans is that banks are enticed to participate in riskier 
loans by being offered both higher fees and higher spreads. Regarding CB transactions, banks increase 
their effort to underwrite riskier securities if the management fee they receive over the life of the 
transaction increases. The coefficient of the management fee is insignificant for AS transactions. This 
makes sense because in an AS transaction (i) banks are usually the originator; i.e., banks sell the assets to 
a separate entity (SPV), which then issues securities; and (ii) the originator retains the servicing function 
and thus receives the servicing fee. 
The upfront fee is a fee paid by a borrower to a bank syndicate for syndicating a loan in a PF 
transaction. Credit spreads and fees are usually complements or substitutes in syndicated loans; i.e., 
arrangers are usually ‘paid’ by spreads and fees. It is worth noting that for PF loans both management fee 
and upfront fees are significantly and positively correlated with credit spreads, which supports the idea 
that risk is priced jointly through spreads and fees. These findings are consistent to those presented by 
Blanc-Brude and Strange (2007) and by Gatti et al. (2013). 
6.3. Additional Sensitivity Tests 
We have performed a number of additional robustness checks that further control for a number of 
contractual features that are different between loans and bonds as well as for adjustments to our rating and 
country risk variables. 
First, we test the sensitivity of our results to the inclusion of specific variables that can only be 
included in regression models for bond credit spreads. Collateral is a dummy variable available only for 
AS bonds. Similarly, callable and fixed rate are variables available only for AS and CB issues. We can 
argue, therefore, the possibility that introducing such variables might affect our results. Our models [2b] 
and [2c] were thus re-estimated after adding collateral, callable, and fixed rate dummy variables for AS 
bonds and callable and fixed rate dummy variables for CB issues. As expected, we find a significantly 
negative coefficient for the collateral dummy variable. This means that MBS (i.e., securities backed by 
mortgages) have an average credit spread lower than ABS (i.e., securities backed by consumer-backed 
products) by 51.72 bps. One interpretation is that the collateral of MBS is less diverse and subject to less 
price volatility than the collateral of ABS. Likewise, the existence of a mortgage reduces the expected 
loss in a scenario of default. Although insignificant for AS bond issues, fixed rate and callable dummy 
variables have a strong positive relationship with credit spreads for CB issues. Regarding the fixed rate 
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dummy variable, the result for CB issues can clearly be easily explained since the coupon rates on these 
bonds do not fluctuate and are typically protected to avoid the risk of rising interest rates. This indicates 
that CB borrowers on average have to pay an extra risk premium on fixed coupon rate issues in 
comparison with floating rate issues by 49.70 bps. The introduction of a call option in a CB issue 
increases the credit spread by 55.55 bps. Thus, an issuer has to pay a premium to have the right to redeem 
the bond before the bond maturity. 
Second, we test the sensitivity of the results reported in models [2a], [2b], and [2c] adjusting our 
rating scale. We reclassified the S&P’s ratings into five categories ranging from best to default, like the 
one proposed by Corielli et al. (2010). Additionally, we also replace the country risk with the Euromoney 
country risk scores. 
Overall, these additional sensitivity tests further confirm the robustness of our results. Our 
estimates remain unchanged when we adjust our rating scale as proposed by Corielli et al. (2010) and use 
the Euromoney country risk scores, and appear robust to the inclusion of variables controlling for specific 
contractual features of AS bonds and CB issues. 
7. Summary and Conclusions 
This study compared the financial characteristics of structured finance (SF), either project finance 
loans or asset securitization bonds, and straight debt finance (SDF) – corporate bonds – transactions by 
means of a comparative statistical and econometric analysis of ex ante credit spreads for a large cross 
section of Western European loans and bonds closed between January 1
st
, 2000 and December 31
st
, 2011. 
Our ‘full sample’ contained information about 599 asset securitization issues (worth Euro 179.1 billion), 
20,977 corporate bond issues (worth Euro 5,786.5 billion), and 2,859 project finance loans (worth Euro 
332.1 billion). 
We found that project finance loans have higher credit spreads (198.3 bps) than asset 
securitization bonds (148.9 bps) and corporate bonds (157.6 bps) and that average credit spreads for asset 
securitization and corporate bond issues do not differ significantly. Despite determinants and impacts of 
different managerial decisions can be more transparently observed through SPVs than in corporate 
finance settings [see, e.g., Shah and Thakor (1987) and Leland (2007)], this result evidences that project 
finance transactions do not enable sponsors to obtain a reduction in the cost of funding. However, it is 
important to notice that a firm’s rational value maximizer manager/owner should choose between project 
financing and corporate financing, based on the cost of capital efficiency of the available financing 
alternatives. The decision either to go with a project finance transaction or with a corporate bond issue, 
should be based on the trade-off between the composite cost of capital of the project finance and the 
sponsor’s, and the sponsor’s overall cost of capital after the corporate bond issue. This idea is 
corroborated by Leland (2007), which argues that “… keeping activities separate offers the advantage of 
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optimizing the separate capital structures…” allowing for greater leverage and financial benefits. Cheaper 
financing for assets that remain in the firm and preserving core firm financial assets are two commonly 
cited justifications for project finance.  
We also found that the pricing factors of SF credit spreads differ significantly when compared 
with the pricing factors of SDF credit spreads. Both asset securitization and corporate bond issues have a 
significant higher tranche size in comparison with project finance loans and asset securitization bonds 
have much longer average maturity and are more likely to be arranged for U.K. borrowers than project 
finance and corporate bond issues. Project finance loans in Western Europe may be considered relatively 
more risky, are much less likely to be subject to currency risk and borrowers are, on average, located in 
far riskier countries than in the case of any other issue category. Corporate bond issues are more likely to 
be fixed rate rather than floating rate credits and less likely to be guaranteed. 
Loan pricing regression analyses revealed that SF and SDF transactions are not priced in a single 
integrated market; i.e., the regression analyses performed suggest that SF and SDF are in fact different 
instruments. Table 7 summarizes our findings. We found, as we expected based on empirical literature, 
that credit spreads rise when ratings worsen for project finance, asset securitization, and corporate bond 
issues. Similarly, the slope of the Euro swap curve impacts negatively on the credit spread of all types of 
debt issues. Project finance loan credit spreads are higher when there is a mismatch in the currency of the 
borrower’s home country and the currency of the PF loan repayment, a borrower belongs to a country 
with higher credit risk, and a higher number of banks participate in the transaction. Project finance loan 
credit spreads and fees are shown to be complements rather than supplements. The transaction size and 
the level of interest rates significantly reduce project finance loan credit spreads. The level of volatility in 
capital markets proves positively related to asset securitization and corporate bond issue credit spreads, 
while the number of banks participating has a negative impact on credit spreads. The loan to value ratio 
has a significant negative relationship with credit spread across asset securitization bonds and borrowers 
belonging to financial industry raise funds in asset securitization market at lower credit spreads. 
Corporate bond issue credit spreads are positively influenced by management fee, the risk free rate, the 
loan to value ratio, the number of tranches, and currency risk. Finally, the type of collateral in an asset 
securitization transaction and the type of the interest rate and if the bond is callable in a corporate bond 
issue determine the credit spread.  
The 2007/2008 financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis does have a 
significant impact on SF and SDF credit spreads as well as on the common pricing factors of loan and 
bond issues. The average credit spread has increased 192.2 bps for project finance loans, 63.0 bps for 
asset securitization bonds, and 94.8 bps for corporate bond issues during the crisis period. Credit rating 
proves the most important pricing factor for asset securitization securities at launch during pre-crisis 
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period. We can identify a change in the type of factors that explain project finance loan credit spreads, 
from marketability factors to default factors between pre-crisis and crisis period. The change in the type 
of factors that explain corporate bond credit spreads can also be explained by a liquidity shortfall in 
financial markets during the crisis period. 
We have also analyzed the term structure of credit spreads for SF transactions compared to SDF 
transactions. For project finance loans, a robust hump-shaped relationship between credit spread and 
maturity was found. The logarithmic maturity term turned out insignificant for asset securitization bonds 
and a linear positive relationship between credit spread and maturity remained strongly significant for 
corporate bond issues. Our results and analysis help to explain why maturity, which is a major systematic 
driver of the cost of debt in SDF, only has a marginal linear effect on the credit spread of SF transactions. 
Our findings hold after controlling for a number of contractual features that are different between 
loans and bonds, for adjustments to our rating and country risk variables, and are robust to endogeneity 
bias of maturity. 
This study contributes to the available literature in several ways. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first work studying how common pricing factors compare between SF and SDF 
transactions. This gap in the literature is due to a lack of reliable data concerning the structure of asset 
securitization transactions. In this study, we overcome this problem by simultaneously using two 
databases: DealScan and DCM Analytics. 
Second, the present work adds new insights to the banking literature on loan pricing. By 
concluding that the existence of substantial differences between SF and SDF transactions in the impact of 
common pricing variables on credit spread, we can state that these transactions are priced differently. The 
investment banks in charge of structuring the technical features of certain project finance and asset 
securitization issues may find the estimates a useful tool concerning the size of each variable’s impact on 
credit spreads and how they compare to SDF transactions, mainly after the 2007/2008 financial crisis. 
Third, we contribute to the literature available on financial crises. The 2007/2008 financial crisis 
and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis significantly influence the explanatory power of the 
regressions, as well as the coefficients of the macro and micro pricing factors (in sign and in 
significance). From our regression analyses, we can also conclude that, in SDF lending, borrowers 
typically specify the amount of debt they are seeking, and their creditworthiness becomes the main 
determinant of loan spreads. By contrast, when an SF transaction is arranged by investment banks, the 
goal is to come up with the most efficient mix of maturities, spreads, tranches, warrantees, and other 
credit enhancement mechanisms to manage what lenders perceive to be the risk and the probability of 
default. This means that for SF transactions, mainly in asset securitization issues, credit rating becomes 
the most important pricing factor for this asset class when launched. Our findings are in line with those of, 
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e.g., Fender and Mitchell (2005), who argues that the increasing complexity of SF products creates 
incentives to rely more heavily on ratings than for other financing instruments, which is usually presented 
as one of the principal shortcomings of asset securitization with regard to the 2007/2008 financial crisis. 
Fourth, the present work points to the need to rethink the way banking regulation treats project 
finance loans. Considering that we find a hump-shaped relationship between credit spread and maturity, a 
linear maturity adjustment to capital requirements – credit risk is usually viewed as increasing with 
maturity – might be less applicable to project finance loans. Hence, regulatory capital arbitrage could 
induce banks to concentrate their loan portfolio on short-term vis-a-vis long-term project finance 
transactions, which might not be necessarily safer. 
Finally, our results are in line with security design literature. SF transactions, based on 
extensively contractual and security design, allow the reduction of the net costs associated with market 
imperfections, namely agency problems and asymmetric information. Considering that (i) the average 
loan to value ratio is significantly lower for SF transactions, and (ii) the average number of tranches is 
significantly higher for this type of transactions, we can conclude that SF transactions may benefit from 
tranching to a larger degree. Accordingly to Lacker (1990), Diamond (1993), Winton (1995), and Glaeser 
and Kallal (1997), in asset securitization the design and issuance of different classes of securities with 
different degrees of seniority reduces monitoring costs. Our results corroborate these findings, as credit 
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Table 1: Basic characteristics for the full sample of Project Finance loans, Asset Securitization 
bonds, and Corporate Bonds 
 
 




















N/A means that information about credit rating is not available. 
 
 
Variable of interest Project Finance Loans Asset Securitization Bonds Corporate Bonds
Number of tranches 2,859 599 20,977
Total volume, Euro millions 332,114 179,132 5,786,532
Tranche size, Euro millions
Average 116 299 276
Minimum 0.045 0.050 0.017
Maximum 3,800 22,298 7,763
Average maturity, years 13.6 20.9 5.3
Tranches with guarantee (% ) 96.9 100.0 2.1
Tranches with currency risk (% ) 11.0 31.4 33.2
Tranches to U.K. borrowers (% ) 21.2 48.7 13.5
Tranches to financial institutions (% ) 0.428 74.1 80.8













AAA / Aaa 1 242.8 121.7 466.7 63.6 336.5 73.2
AA+ / Aa1 2 107.8 82.3 436.9 103.7
AA / Aa2 3 70.0 124.4 860.6 103.7 263.3 95.6
AA- / Aa3 4 107.3 80.0 75.2 111.8 394.5 117.3
A+ / A1 5 37.2 31.2 121.9 300.5 93.3
A / A2 6 89.7 77.4 120.3 157.0 275.9 112.6
A- / A3 7 339.6 174.5 164.4 109.3 406.6 122.5
BBB+ / Baa1 8 264.8 154.9 116.2 217.0 514.0 164.9
BBB / Baa2 9 320.9 150.4 65.0 212.1 456.3 203.1
BBB- / Baa3 10 248.0 150.5 50.8 304.6 417.3 250.5
BB+ / Ba1 11 36.0 597.3 522.2 383.7
BB / Ba2 12 44.5 413.0 463.1 414.9
BB- / Ba3 13 199.8 232.1 67.4 579.8 319.8 440.2
B+ / B1 14 827.3 404.2 573.8
B / B2 15 700.0 21.7 572.9 301.5 604.3
B- / B3 16 700.0 205.9 250.2 637.0
CCC+ / Caa1 17 607.5 215.6 313.9 709.3
CCC / Caa2 18 140.0 740.1
CCC- / Caa3 19 203.6 810.9
CC / Ca 20 64.2 811.3
SD / C 21 153.7 638.2
D / - 22
N/A - 112.4 200.8 172.2 200.7 78.0 246.2
Total 116.2 198.3 299.1 148.9 275.9 157.6







Table 3: Univariate statistics - pricing features associated with Loans and Bonds compared 
 
 
PF AS CB PF AS CB
Univariate analysis - continuous variables
Credit spread (bps) Number of tranches
Number 1,090 439 10,551 Number 2,845 599 20,575
Mean 198.3 148.9 157.6 Mean 2.9 4.5 18.4
Min. 9.2 -220.4 -213.8 Min. 1 1 1
Max. 2,042.7 1,098.9 1,651.5 Max. 10 12 99
Std. Dev. 138.5 167.4 193.3 Std. Dev. 1.7 2.7 29.8
Credit rating [1-22 weak] Number of bookrunners
Number 80 497 16,080 Number 955 599 20,973
Mean 7 4.3 4.9 Mean 2.1 1.4 1.6
Min. 1 1 1 Min. 1 1 0
Max. 16 17 21 Max. 15 5 21
Std. Dev. 3.9 3.5 2.7 Std. Dev. 1.9 0.7 1.2
Loan to value (% ) Number of banks
Number 2,859 599 20,977 Number 2,829 599 20,973
Mean 47.3% 36.4% 61.8% Mean 6.9 2.4 2.9
Min. 0.07% 0.01% 0.05% Min. 1 1 1
Max. 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% Max. 51 14 50
Std. Dev. 39.4% 35.6% 45.4% Std. Dev. 6.7 1.9 3.4
Time to maturity (years) Country risk [1-22 weak]
Number 2,573 599 20,977 Number 2,859 599 20,977
Mean 13.6 20.9 5.3 Mean 2.1 1.3 1.4
Min. 0.03 0.22 0.21 Min. 1 1 1
Max. 42.9 85.9 100.1 Max. 11 6 20
Std. Dev. 9.3 14.8 5.9 Std. Dev. 1.7 0.9 1.2
Tranche size (Euro millions) Management fee (bps)
Number 2,859 599 20,977 Number 140 48 2,235
Mean 116.2 299.1 275.9 Mean 49.0 33.1 22.7
Min. 0.05 0.05 0.02 Min. 0.8 2.0 0.0
Max. 3,800 22,298 7,763.2 Max. 200.0 100.0 200.0
Std. Dev. 225.9 1,070.4 439.5 Std. Dev. 34.4 26.9 18.9
Univariate analysis - dummy variables
Guarantee Currency risk
N. of issues with data available 2,270 599 20,977 N. of issues with data available 2,859 599 20,977
N. of issues with dummy = 1 2,200 599 449 N. of issues with dummy = 1 315 188 6,967
% of total available data 96.9% 100.0% 2.1% % of total available data 11.0% 31.4% 33.2%
Floating rate issue U.K. borrowers
N. of issues with data available 1,110 599 20,977 N. of issues with data available 2,859 599 20,977
N. of issues with dummy = 1 1,094 450 4,400 N. of issues with dummy = 1 2,253 292 2,836
% of total available data 98.6% 75.1% 21.0% % of total available data 21.2% 48.7% 13.5%
Fixed rate issue Financial institutions
N. of issues with data available 1,110 599 20,977 N. of issues with data available 2,805 599 20,977
N. of issues with dummy = 1 16 149 16,577 N. of issues with dummy = 1 12 444 16,952
% of total available data 1.4% 24.9% 79.0% % of total available data 0.4% 74.1% 80.8%
Variable of interest




Table 4: Tests of significance for the difference in values among PF, AS and CB issues 
 
 
For continuous variables, 
#
 indicates that the values do not differ significantly between the two loan issues at the 5% 
significance level. For dummy variables, 
*
 indicates that the proportion of tranches for which dummy = 1 does not 
differ significantly between the issue class. 
 
AS versus PF AS versus CB CB versus PF
Continuous variables: two-sample t -tests assuming unequal variances
Credit spread (bps) -5.47 -1.06
#
-8.85
Credit rating [1-22 weak] -5.70 -3.77 -4.68
Loan to value (% ) -6.67 -17.11 18.19
Time to maturity (years) 11.75 25.84 -43.92
Tranche size (Euro millions) 4.16 0.53
#
30.70
Number of tranches 12.94 -59.35 73.65
Number of bookrunners -9.44 -6.43 -7.18
Number of banks -30.14 -6.22 -30.78
Country risk [1-22 weak] -16.70 -2.72 -21.66
Management fee (bp) -3.28 2.68 -8.99
Dummy variables: Fisher's exact test (p-values)
Guarantee (0/1) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Fixed rate issue (0/1) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Currency risk (0/1) 0.000 0.356
*
0.000
U.K. borrowers (0/1) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Financial institutions (0/1) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Variable of interest
Type of loan issue
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This table reports statistics for characteristics of PF, AS, and CB issues which are separated into two sub-samples: 
pre-crisis period and crisis period. 






 indicate that equality of means can be rejected at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
 
Number Mean Std. Dev. Number Mean Std. Dev. Number Mean Std. Dev.
Continuous variables
Credit spread (bps)
pre-crisis 742 136.9 97.9 401 143.5 156.7 6,981 125.5 197.6
crisis 348 329.1 120.5 38 206.5 250.3 3,570 220.3 167.6
Credit rating [1-22 weak]
pre-crisis 65 6.9 4.3 465 4.3 3.5 12,353 4.8 2.4
crisis 15 7.6 2.2 32 4.0 4.1 3,727 5.4 3.2
Loan to value (% )
pre-crisis 1,449 48.7% 39.3% 555 35.7% 35.4% 16,673 55.6% 47.0%
crisis 1,410 45.8% 39.4% 44 45.5% 36.5% 4,304 86.1% 27.0%
Time to maturity (years)
pre-crisis 1,288 14.1 9.5 555 20.5 14.6 16,673 5.0 5.4
crisis 1,285 13.0 8.9 44 26.7 16.0 4,304 6.8 7.2
Tranche size (Euro millions)
pre-crisis 1,449 124.0 231.3 555 240.6 509.6 16,673 235.7 395.2
crisis 1,410 108.2 219.9 44 1,035.9 3,462.4 4,304 431.3 553.3
Number of tranches
pre-crisis 1,437 2.9 1.6 555 4.6 2.8 16,278 22.9 32.0
crisis 1,408 3.0 1.7 44 2.5 0.7 4,297 1.5 1.1
Number of bookrunners
pre-crisis 723 1.9 1.4 555 1.4 0.7 16,669 1.4 0.8
crisis 232 2.7 2.8 44 1.2 0.7 4,304 2.5 1.9
Number of banks
pre-crisis 1,437 8.0 7.1 555 2.5 1.9 16,669 2.8 3.4
crisis 1,392 5.7 6.1 44 1.3 0.7 4,304 3.4 3.3
Country risk [1-22 weak]
pre-crisis 1,449 1.8 1.4 555 1.3 0.8 16,673 1.3 1.0
crisis 1,410 2.5 1.8 44 2.3 1.6 4,304 1.8 1.8
Management fee (bps)
pre-crisis 107 40.8 23.1 48 33.1 26.9 2,009 22.3 17.9












Type of loan issue
Corporate Bonds
-2.44 ** -44.90 ***
-9.89 ***-0.40
-1.52 -38.93 ***2.54 **
***
-2.65 *** -30.58 ***2.75 ***
*** 37.63 ***-1.88 *
-3.26 *** -29.20 ***5.71
10.76 ***
2.36 ** -44.55 ***-3.99 ***
-4.83 ***
-7.65 *** -20.51 ***-13.05 ***
- -0.47








The number of observations are reported in the column ‘Number’ and the number of issues with dummy = 1 in 
column ‘Number (d=1)’. 
*




















pre-crisis 888 866 97.5% 555 555 100.0% 16,673 322 1.9%
crisis 1,382 1,334 96.5% 44 44 100.0% 4,304 127 3.0%
Fixed rate issue
pre-crisis 749 7 0.9% 555 143 25.8% 16,673 13,113 78.6%
crisis 361 9 2.5% 44 6 13.6% 4,304 3,464 80.5%
Currency risk
pre-crisis 1,449 186 12.8% 555 186 33.5% 16,673 5,631 33.8%
crisis 1,410 129 9.1% 44 2 4.5% 4,304 1,336 31.0%
U.K. borrowers
pre-crisis 1,449 369 25.5% 555 286 51.5% 16,673 2,047 12.3%
crisis 1,410 237 16.8% 44 6 13.6% 4,304 789 18.3%
Financial institutions
pre-crisis 1,438 4 0.3% 555 400 72.1% 16,673 14,255 85.5%





































Table 7: Definition of variables, expected sign, and findings 
 
(Continued) 
PF AS CB PF AS CB
Dependent variable:
Credit spread For loans: Libor spread plus difference between three-month Libor and 
three-month German Treasury yield at the time of the signing of the loan. 
For bonds: spread at issue over comparable risk-free government security 
with a comparable maturity.
Independent variables:
Microeconomic independent variables
Log transaction size Natural log of the loan or bond transaction size. Transaction size is 
converted into Euro millions when necessary.
Eichengreen & Mody (1998, 2000) | Kleimeier & 
Megginson (2000) | Maris & Segal (2002) | Campbell & 
Taksler (2003) | Firla-Cuchra (2005) | Gabbi & Sironi 
(2005) | Blanc-Brude & Strande (2007) | Chen et al. 
(2007) | Sorge & Gadanecz (2008) | Vink & Thibeault 
(2008) | Buscaino et al.  (2009) | Gatti et al. (2013) |
- / I - - / I - I ?
Log loan to value Natural log of the loan to value ratio, which represents the ratio of the 
tranche size to the transaction size of a given loan or bond.
Vink & Thibeault (2008) |   
+ - + + / I - +
Maturity Maturity of loan or bond, in years. Sarig & Warga (1989) | Helwege & Turner (1999) | He 
et al. (2000) | Kleimeier & Megginson (2000) | Duffie & 
Singleton (2001) | Campbell & Taksler (2003) | Chen et 
al.  (2007) | Blanc-Brude & Strande (2007) | Sorge & 
Gadanecz (2008) | Vink & Thibeault (2008) | Corielli et 
al. (2010) | Gatti et al.  (2013) |
? - / I ? HS I +
Number of tranches The number of tranches for each transaction. Firla-Cuchra & Jenkinson (2006) | Vink & Thibeault 
(2008) | 
+ - + I / - I +
Number of banks The number of financial institutions participating in the loan or bond 
issuance.
Strahan (1999) | Esty & Megginson (2000, 2003) | 
Kleimeier & Megginson (2000) | Guner (2006) | Gupta 
et al.  (2008) | Sorge & Gadanecz (2008) | Vink & 
Thibeault (2008) |
? - / I - + - -
Currency risk Dummy equal to 1 for loans that are denominated in a currency different 
from the currency in the borrower's home country. Dummy equal to 1 for 
bonds that are denominated in a currency different from the currency in the 
deal's nationality.
Kleimeier & Megginson (2000) | Vink & Thibeault 
(2008) | Corielli et al.  (2010) | Gatti et al.  (2013) |
- / I + + + I +
U.K. borrowers Dummy equal to 1 if the borrower/issuer belongs to U.K. - - - + / I I I / -
Sector Dummies equal to 1 if loan or bond finances a borrower/issuer in a certain 
industry. For each of the following industry groups, a dummy is created: 
commercial, industrial, utilities, transportation, government, and other. The 
control group includes financial institutions.
Kleimeier & Megginson (2000) | Sorge & Gadanecz 
(2008) | Corielli et al.  (2010) | Gatti et al.  (2013) |
? + ? I I / + ?
Rating Loan and bond rating based on the S&P and Moody's rating at close; i.e., at 
the time of issuing the bond or closing the loan. The rating is converted as 
follows: AAA=Aaa=1, AA+=Aa1=2, and so on until D=22.
Duffie & Singleton (1999) | Kleimeier & Megginson 
(2000) | Collin-Dufresne et al.  (2001) | Elton et al. 
(2001) | Hull et al.  (2004) | Firla-Cuchra (2005) | Gabbi 
& Sironi (2005) | Gorton & Souleles (2005) | Longstaff 
et al.  (2005) | Hu & Cantor (2006) | Chen et al.  (2007) 
| Vink & Thibeault (2008) | Buscaino et al.  (2009) |  










The following characters mean: – = negative impact on the credit spread | + = positive impact on the credit spread | I = insignificant impact on the credit spread | ? = 
sign cannot be clearly determined | NA = information about this variable is not available | HS = hump-shaped. 
 
 
Table 8: Chow test for differences in pricing factor coefficients 
 
 
The test statistic follows the F distribution with k and N1+N2-2k degrees of freedom. 
PF AS CB PF AS CB
Independent variables:
Microeconomic independent variables
Management fee Fees (in bps) that are periodically paid to the bank syndicates. Kleimeier & Megginson (2000) | Blanc-Brude & 
Strande (2007) | Gabbi & Sironi (2005) |
+ + + / I + I +
Upfront fee A fee (in bps) paid by a borrower to a bank or a syndicate of banks for 
arranging a PF loan.
Blanc-Brude & Strande (2007) | Kleimeier & 
Megginson (2000) | Gatti et al.  (2013) | + NA NA + NA NA
Collateral Dummy equal to 1 if an AS bond is backed by mortgages and 0 otherwise. Gorton & Souleles (2005) | Fabozzi et al.  (2006) | Vink 
& Thibeault (2008) | NA - NA NA - NA
Fixed rate Dummy equal to 1 if a loan or bond is fixed price and 0 otherwise. Sorge & Gadanecz (2008) | Vink & Thibeault (2008) | + + + NA I +
Callable Dummy equal to 1 if the bond has a call option and 0 otherwise. Davidson et al.  (2003) | Fabozzi et al.  (2006) | Kothari 
(2006) | NA + + NA I +
Independent variables:
Macroeconomic independent variables
Country risk S&P's country credit rating at close. The rating is converted as follows: 
AAA=1, AA+=2, and so on until D=22. 
Kleimeier & Megginson (2000) | Corielli et al.  (2010) | 
Gatti et al.  (2013) | + ? + + I I
Crisis Dummy equal to 1 if the issue date belongs to the crisis period and 0 
otherwise.
Benmelech & Dlugosz (2009) | Brunnermeier (2009) | 
Jobst (2009) | Gatti et al.  (2013) | + + + + + / I +
Risk free rate The three-month German Treasury bill at the time of the signing of the loan 
or issuing the bonds - a proxy for the general level of interest rates.
Scott & Smith (1986) | Eichengreen & Mody (1998) | 
Blanc-Brude & Strande (2007) | Flannery et al.  (2012) | I + + - I +
Volatility The Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX). VIX reflects 
a market estimate of future volatility.
Krishnan et al.  (2005) | Chen et al.  (2007) | Flannery 
et al.  (2012) | + + + I + +
EUSA5y-Libor3M The slope of the Euro swap curve. Obtained as the difference between the 
five-year Euro swap rate and the 3-month Libor rate.
Campbell & Taksler (2003) | Krishnan et al. (2005) | 
Hu & Cantor (2006) | Chen et al.  (2007) | Sorge & 
Gadanecz (2008) |  Flannery et al.  (2012) |




Type of loan issue PF AS CB
PF - - -
AS 6.62 - -




Table 9: Regression analyses of the determinants of credit spreads 
 
 
Table 9 presents an OLS regression analysis of the determinants of loans and bonds credit spread for SF (PF and 
AS) and SDF (CB) samples. 





that the reported coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
The following variables were omitted because of collinearity: commercial and other dummy variables in estimating 
model [1a]. Government and other dummy variables do not exist for AS transactions. 
 
 
Dependent variable: [1a] [1b] [1c]




















Maturity 0.51 -0.72 -1.14
**
(1.67) (-1.52) (-3.91)
Number of tranches -1.02 -3.08 12.36
**
(-0.56) (-0.95) (13.31)

















































Industrial 10.29 57.95 92.63
**
(1.14) (1.56) (17.48)
Utilities 12.92 -16.49 12.63
*
(1.41) (-0.42) (2.37)












F 90.00 6.55 240.95
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Table 10: Regression analyses of the determinants of credit spreads – the impact of credit risk 
 
 
Table 10 presents the results of an OLS regression analysis of determinants of loan pricing credit spreads for the PF, 
AS, and CB high-information samples and the sub-samples created using the data available on rating. 





that the reported coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
The following variables were omitted because of collinearity: (i) commercial and other dummy variables in 
estimating model [1a]; and (ii) commercial, transportation and other dummy variables in estimating model [2a]. 
Government and other dummy variables do not exist for AS transactions. 
 
Dependent variable: [1a] [2a] [1b] [2b] [1c] [2c]
Credit spread (bps) All PF Loans PF Loans with 
rating
All AS Bonds AS Bonds with 
rating









(9.43) (0.38) (2.37) (0.31) (1.85) (-17.64)
Log transaction size -19.52
**
4.56 -6.75 3.74 -9.63
**
1.55
(-4.93) (0.27) (-1.52) (0.92) (-7.15) (1.22)








(2.04) (1.52) (-5.48) (0.10) (-7.02) (4.17)




(1.67) (-0.99) (-1.52) (-0.67) (-3.91) (5.05)




(-0.56) (1.73) (-0.95) (0.86) (13.31) (8.03)










(3.87) (0.14) (-2.58) (-2.10) (-4.11) (-4.99)
Country risk 7.78
**
-15.27 -12.80 -4.99 0.32 -2.15
(2.91) (-1.09) (-1.04) (-0.74) (0.20) (-1.60)
Currency risk 38.11
**
-8.52 16.95 35.36 -5.53 28.61
**
(2.88) (-0.30) (0.79) (1.96) (-1.08) (7.04)
U.K. borrowers 49.85
**
46.73 10.39 -10.10 19.39
**
6.66









(16.26) (0.68) (2.43) (0.74) (15.93) (20.17)
Risk free rate -0.16
**




(-4.46) (-1.75) (1.28) (-0.31) (7.26) (5.34)
































(1.14) (2.15) (1.56) (0.99) (17.48) (0.34)




(1.41) (1.48) (-0.42) (-1.52) (2.37) (-8.16)





(1.39) (1.88) (3.64) (5.66) (1.49)
Government 7.18 10.78 24.34 30.89
**













Number of observations 1,029 39 439 364 10,543 8,686
Adjusted R
2
0.51 0.68 0.19 0.46 0.22 0.44
F 90.00 5.98 6.55 11.45 240.95 247.81
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Table 11: Regression analyses of the determinants of credit spreads - the impact of the financial crisis 
 
 
Table 11 presents the results of an OLS regression analysis of determinants of loan pricing credit spreads for the PF, 
AS, and CB sub-samples created by considering a pre-crisis period from January 1
st
, 2000 through September 14
th
, 
2008, and a crisis period from September 15
th
, 2008 through December 31
st
, 2011. 




 indicate that 
the reported coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
The following variables were omitted because of collinearity: (i) commercial and other dummy variables in 
estimating model [1a], either in pre-crisis period and crisis period; (ii) volatility and EUSA5y-Libor3M and all sector 
dummy variables in estimating model [2b] for the crisis period; and (iii) government dummy variable for crisis 
period in estimating model [2c]. The rating variable was omitted because it would cause a significant reduction in 
the number of observations in estimating model [1a] (36 and 3 observations for the pre-crisis and the crisis period, 
respectively). 
 
Dependent variable: [1a] [1a] [2b] [2b] [2c] [2c]
Credit spread (bps) All PF Loans | 
pre-crisis 
period
All PF Loans | 
crisis period
AS Bonds with 
rating | pre-
crisis period
AS Bonds with 

















(6.96) (11.44) (-0.17) (1.83) (-6.35) (-10.97)








(-3.35) (-2.75) (0.91) (-0.83) (-8.48) (17.29)





(0.92) (2.50) (0.16) (-0.60) (2.60) (-0.85)
Maturity 1.05
**




(2.97) (-1.12) (-0.88) (1.77) (3.81) (3.18)




(0.62) (-0.62) (1.00) (-1.81) (7.90) (-2.21)







(3.99) (0.75) (-2.35) (-0.02) (-6.35) (-1.87)






(0.94) (2.70) (-0.11) (-1.49) (-13.55) (4.86)
Currency risk 30.31
*













(4.15) (2.78) (-0.20) (-1.10) (-2.81) (4.92)


























(-5.59) (-5.20) (-2.62) (-3.37) (-2.61)
















(0.37) (2.80) (-1.55) (-4.40) (-9.50)
Transportation 1.16 38.71 98.98
**
17.37 -16.28
(0.10) (1.36) (3.98) (1.82) (-1.29)













(10.05) (-0.22) (29.47) (36.58)
Number of observations 702 327 334 30 5,594 3,092
Adjusted R
2
0.11 0.27 0.52 0.23 0.36 0.53
F 8.49 7.77 15.38 1.87 127.12 128.84
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Table 12: Regression analyses of the term structure of credit spreads 
 
 
Model [3a] is similar to model [1a] adding the logarithmic of maturity. Rating variable was omitted either because 
of collinearity or because of the significant reduction in the number of observations (from 1,029 to 39) that it would 
impose. 




 indicate that 
the reported coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
The following variables were omitted because of collinearity: commercial and other dummy variables in estimating 
models [1a] and [3a]. Government and other dummy variables do not exist for AS transactions. 
 
Dependent variable: [1a] [3a] [2b] [3b] [2c] [3c]
Credit spread (bps) All PF Loans All PF Loans 
with 
log maturity
AS Bonds with 
rating

































3.74 4.11 1.55 1.49
(-4.93) (-5.12) (0.92) (1.01) (1.22) (1.16)
Log loan to value 4.37
*




(2.04) (1.27) (0.10) (0.12) (4.17) (4.14)




(-0.56) (-0.68) (0.86) (1.05) (8.03) (8.03)

















-4.99 -5.23 -2.15 -2.27














-10.10 -6.30 6.66 6.65









(16.26) (16.59) (0.74) (0.81) (20.17) (20.17)








(-4.46) (-4.54) (-0.31) (-0.26) (5.34) (5.38)





















(-7.41) (-8.43) (-4.35) (-4.44) (-2.79) (-2.77)




(0.99) (0.90) (-3.57) (-3.37)
Industrial 10.29 9.98 27.34 25.80 1.41 2.24
(1.14) (1.12) (0.99) (0.93) (0.34) (0.54)




(1.41) (0.81) (-1.52) (-1.59) (-8.16) (-7.80)





(1.39) (1.32) (3.64) (3.74) (1.49) (1.63)


















(8.65) (8.74) (43.35) (43.69)
Number of observations 1,029 1,029 364 364 8,686 8,686
Adjusted R
2
0.51 0.63 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.44
F 90.00 87.18 11.45 11.06 247.81 238.60
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Table 13: Robustness checks: endogeneity of maturity 
 
 
Table 13 presents the results of 2SLS regressions on credit spreads for PF and CB transactions. 




 indicate that 
the reported coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
The following variables were omitted because of collinearity: commercial and other dummy variables in estimating 




 for the OLS regressions, and a test of over identification for the instrumental-variables (IV) 
regressions [Sargan (1958)] with the p-value in parentheses. 
b
 F test for the OLS regressions, and a F statistic for the joint significance of the coefficients on the additional 
instruments (PF loans: tranche size and year; CB: number of bookrunners and year) with the p-value in parentheses. 
Dependent variable: [1a] [4a] [2c] [4c]
Credit spread (bps) All PF Loans 
(OLS)






















(1.67) (2.44) (5.05) (2.60)






(-4.93) (-4.30) (1.22) (2.39)






(2.04) (-1.69) (4.17) (3.47)






(-0.56) (-2.18) (8.03) (4.43)





































(16.26) (11.96) (20.17) (8.02)








(-4.46) (-3.76) (5.34) (4.23)



















Industrial 10.29 3.17 1.41 -30.34
*
(1.14) (0.25) (0.34) (-2.04)




(1.41) (0.96) (-8.16) (-3.04)
Transportation 14.33 12.72 12.27 -84.33
*
(1.39) (0.86) (1.49) (-2.02)
Government 7.18 9.53 30.89
**
-71.29










Number of observations 1,029 1,029 8,686 8,686
Fit/Test of Over Identification
a 0.51 0.38 0.44 0.95
(0.537) (0.329)
F




Graph 1: Credit spread versus maturity with confidence bands: CB 
 
 
Graph 1 plots credit spread against maturity, it plots the prediction from a quadratic 
regression and adds the confidence interval on the basis of the standard error of forecast. 
 
Graph 2: Term structure of credit spreads for CB 
 
 
Graph 2 presents the augmented component-plus-residual plot based on regression [3c] 
and depicts the partial relationship between CB credit spread and maturity, once all 
other micro and macro factors have been controlled for.  
The straight line in Graph 2 corresponds to the regression model. The curved line 
reflects the fitting process based on non-parametric regression called local weighted 
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Graph 3: Credit spread versus maturity with confidence bands: PF loans 
 
 
Graph 3 plots credit spread against maturity, it plots the prediction from a quadratic 
regression and adds the confidence interval on the basis of the standard error of forecast. 
 
 
Graph 4: Term structure of credit spreads for PF loans 
 
 
Graph 4 presents the augmented component-plus-residual plot based on regression [3a] 
and depicts the partial relationship between PF loans credit spread and maturity, once all 
other micro and macro factors have been controlled for. 
The straight line in Graph 4 corresponds to the regression model. The curved line 
reflects the fitting process based on non-parametric regression called local weighted 
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Graph 5: Credit spread versus maturity with confidence bands: AS Bonds 
 
 
Graph 5 plots credit spread against maturity, it plots the prediction from a quadratic 
regression and adds the confidence interval on the basis of the standard error of forecast. 
 
 
Graph 6: Term structure of credit spreads for AS bonds 
 
 
Graph 6 presents the augmented component-plus-residual plot based on regression [3b] 
and depicts the partial relationship between AS loans credit spread and maturity, once 
all other micro and macro factors have been controlled for. 
The straight line in Graph 6 corresponds to the regression model. The curved line 
reflects the fitting process based on non-parametric regression called local weighted 
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